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THE THREEFOLD SOCIAL ORGANISM

BY

RUDOLF STEINER

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THE TRIORGANIC SOCIAL ORGANISM

An Exposition of the Embryonal Points of the Social Question in the Life-Necessities of the Present and Future.

By

Rudolph Steiner

Teacher of the Philosophy of Freedom; Painter, Sculptor, Designer, Architect and Builder of the Goetheanum; Creator of the Eurythmic Art; Business Man; Man of Science.

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The Translator.

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

The translation of the expression of an idea appropriate to one language into an expression appropriate to another language, has always been a task peculiarly subject to criticism. The attempt of such translation here made will probably to an unusually high degree call forth criticism. For the task confronting the translator of this work is not the usual task of putting standard German into standard English. The ideas which Rudolf Steiner has now for forty years been revealing to the world have such a semenal potency of life that they have with elemental force created for themselves a form of expression in the German distinctly their own. Not a single pedant in all Germany will admit that Rudolf Steiner speaks or writes "standard" German. And in truth, the standard German of the German pedant could nowhere be employed by Rudolf Steiner to reveal the ideas he experiences. No more compelling prima facie evidence need be entered to show how semenal are the ideas grasped by Rudolf Steiner than the fact that by their own necessity they have created for themselves their own form of expression in the German language. Not even the tough amorphous leather of German philosophic diction could provide a vehicle of expression able adequately to reveal the ideas which Rudolf Steiner portrays. Consequently, it is utterly hopeless to expect that the cut and polished crystal of standard English prose be able adequately to reveal these ideas. It is as imposible to reveal within the confines of standard English prose the ideas which Rudolf Steiner reveals, as it is to force a human spirit into the form of a lion or humming-bird. And he who demands that Rudolf Steiner speak "standard German" and that his works be translated into "standard English" uses the same logic as an hypothetic amphibian might have used with reference to the first mammal that appeared on earth. Such an hypothetic amphibian might very possibly have said: Why does this strange creature gestate within its own body the reproductions of itself instead of casting them from itself as eggs, as all "standard" animals do? To the hypothetic amphibian the first mammal to appear was not possessed of "standard amphibian form,"—as indeed he was not.

Precisely in this predicament are many of us today. We demand new ideas, ideas able efficiently and practically to cope with the really serious questions that confront us. But at the same time we demand that these ideas be expressed in the *form* con-

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versant to our old thinking; as though it were possible that the new wine of really new revelations of the ideas of the universe could be corked into the old bottles of our decrepid habits of thought and speech without bursting them! He to whom the language of King James is "good enough", and who would not depart therefrom, must content himself with the shadows of the ideas that are comprised within the language of King James. Such an one must stick to the Jacobite fourteen points and he may not object when the inevitable logical practical outcome of the shadows of ideas back of these fourteen points, is the heightening of the chaos that already existed in the world.

And this actually has occurred, now that this fourteen-pointed so-called "peace" of Versailles has succeeded the open hari-kari of the World War. A mind determined to cling to these illussory shadows of the past will find in this book only disappointment. It will not be able to breathe in the atmosphere of the ideas here revealed. He, however, who is truly seeking a new revelation of the governing and controlling ideas, of the universe, will more or less kindly disregard the fact that this translation is not a perfectly transparent medium, and will use this book as a means for laying hold on living ideas—ideas which, when borne by living men, are able practically to transform our present chaotic society into a cleanly organated, sound and healthy Triorganic Social Organism.

FOREWORD AS TO THE PURPOSE OF THIS BOOK

The social life of the present day propounds grave and far-reaching problems. We are faced with demands for new forms of social structure. Confronted by these demands, we become aware that the solution of these problems must be sought along paths that have hitherto not been thought of. On the strength of existing facts, perhaps there may today be a chance for him to obtain a hearing, whose experience of life convinces him that the present chaos is due to lack of thought—is due to this very failure to think out roads that have become necessary. The arguments of the following work are based upon such a conviction. Their object is to indicate what must be done in order to turn the demands that are today put forward by a great portion of mankind toward the direction of a social purpose that is resolute and conscious of its goal.

Whether these demands are agreeable to this person or that ought to have but little influence in forming such a resolve. These demands exist, and they have to be reckoned with as facts of social life. This must be remembered by those who, because of their personal position in life, may be inclined to be displeased with the way in which the writer speaks when dealing with the demands of the working class; because, from their point of view, he lays too exclusive

an emphasis on these demands as something to be taken into account in forming a social purpose. But the writer is talking of the life around us today in all its actuality, in so far as his experience of it enables him to speak. He sees clearly the terrible consequences that must ensue if people persist in ignoring those undeniable facts which have actually arisen out of the life of modern humanity, and if they accordingly will have nothing to do with a social purpose which recognizes these facts.

Those persons who regard themselves as experts in practical life—or what, under the influence of fond habit, has come to be considered as practical life, will also, at first reading, be dissatisfied with the author's remarks. They will opine that these pages are not written by a practical person. These are just the people who, in the author's opinion, will radically have to change their ideas. For it seems to him that their practice of life is the very thing which has been shown to be a mistake by the facts which mankind has been forced to experience in our time. Their co-called practice is proven by the facts of life to be the very mistake which has led to such boundlessly disastrous consequences. They will have to recognize that many things must be accepted as practical which to them seem impossible idealism. They may think that the basis of this book is wrong because a good deal is said in its first pages about spiritual and mental life of modern mankind, and not so much about the economic life. The author's experience, however, forces him to hold that the old blunders will only be succeeded by endless new ones unless people make up their minds to pay proper attention to what is going on in the minds and spirits of the men of today.

Neither will what the writer says in this book find much favor with those who, under various forms, keep on reiterating the old phrases, that men must rise above their devotion to merely material interests, and turn to ideals and to the things of the spirit. For the

author does not attach much value to mere talk about the spirit, to speeches about a vague spiritual world. The only kind of spirituality which he is able to recognize is that which forms the content of the actual life of men, and which shows itself no less active in mastering the practical tasks of life than in constructing a philosophy of the universe and of existence capable of satisfying the needs of the soul. The point is not the recognition, or supposed recognition, of something spiritual, but that this spiritual something manifest itself in a grip of practical affairs, and be not a special preserve of the hidden soul, a side-current accompanying the full tide of real life. And so, what is said in these pages may indeed sem to the "spiritually minded" too little spiritual, and to "practical men" too remote from practice. Yet the writer thinks that he may be of use to the present age for this very reason—namely, that he does not share that remoteness from life which characterizes many who today esteem themselves practical, neither can he approve that kind of talk about the spiritual which builds a visionary substance out of phrases.

It is as a problem of economics, of human rights, and of spiritual life that the "social question" is discussed in this book. The writer thinks he perceives how the *"true form"* of the social question can be recognized from the demands of these three domains of life: that of Economics, of Rights, and of the Spirit. And it is only from such a perception that the impulses can come which will cause a healthy development and a proper mutual adaptation of these three domains of life within the social order. In the earlier days of humanity's evolution the social *instincts* caused a harmonization of these three life-domains which was in accord with human nature, as human nature was at that period. In the present stage of human development we are faced with the necessity of working out this harmonization by deliberate and conscious social effort. In the interval between those earlier times and

the present day we find, in those countries which are already ripe for a deliberate social effort, an interweaving of what is ancient and instinctive with what is new and conscious. This state of things is no longer compatible with the needs of modern humanity. But today, in much that is imagined to be deliberate and conscious social thought, the ancient instincts still live on. As a consequence, this thought is impotent to cope with the facts and all that they demand. The men of today have deliberately to work their way out of what has become worn out and lifeless. And this involves a much more radical change than most people are aware of. It is only by a whole-hearted readiness to recognize this fact that it is possible, so the writer thinks, for anyone to perceive exactly how the life of economics, of human rights, and of spirit should be ordered in the way needed for a sound social structure such as the new age itself demands. In the following pages the author offers for the judgment of his contemporaries what he feels called on to say with regard to the form of the new social structure that is demanded by the time. His object in this work is to give an impulse toward a way for realizing social aims that are in unison with the realities and exigencies of modern life. For he is of the opinion: only by means of the striving here characterized can we get beyond utopianism and wordy enthusiasm in the field of social endeavor.

And if anyone thinks that this book itself has something of an utopian character, the writer would beg him to reflect how widely people nowadays depart from real life in many of the conceptions which they form as to possible developments in social conditions, and what hallucinations people cherish today. This is the very reason why something drawn from actual reality and experience of life, in the way attempted in this book, is regarded as utopian. To some people "concrete ideas" are those with which they are familiar, while the really concrete is "an abstraction" when it is

unfamiliar to them. Such persons will doubtless find the following treatise "abstract".*) .

Where people's thoughts are tight-harnessed to a party program, what is here said will meet with no favor; and of this the author is well aware. Yet he believes that many members of the different parties will soon become convinced that the facts of human evolution have already far outstripped all party programs, and that it is absolutely necessary to arrive at an independent judgment outside all party programs when considering the immediate goal towards which the social will must be directed.

Rudolf Steiner.

April, 1919.

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* The author has consciously avoided confining himself in his utterances to the stereotyped terms of economic, political and social thought. He knows the precise places that will be called dilettante by the professors. But he was determined in choosing his words, not only by the fact that he intended to speak to people who were not conversant with the literature of the social sciences, but above all by the consideration that a new time will show even the very form of expression of this "professional" literature of today to be one-sided and inadequate. Whoever thinks the author should also have referred to those social ideas of other men, which seem to be in line, at one point or another, with what is here said, let him consider that the points of departure and the ways of the view here characterized, which are the result of decades of real experience of life, are the essential matters for the practical realization of the impulses that have been given, and not merely thoughts of this or the other tenor. And furthermore, as may be seen from Chapter IV, the author was devoting himself to the practical realization of these impulses at a time when thoughts which seem to be identical with regard to this or that, had not yet been noticed.

CHAPTER I.

The True Form of the Social Question, Grasped from Out the Life of Modern Mankind.

OES not the catastrophe of the World War reveal the modern social movement in a new light? Do not the facts of this great catastrophe prove how inadequate the ideas were by which, for many decades, people fancied they understood what was living in the proletarian will? At present many demands, formerly repressed, are forcing their way to the surface of life. These old demands and what in addition accompanies them now, force us to ask ourselves these questions. The powers which effected this repression have been in part destroyed. To think of maintaining this relation, in which these powers have placed themselves to the social impulsion forces of a large part of mankind, is possible only to him who is totally ignorant of the indestructability of such impulses of human nature.

Many personages, whose positions in life enabled them either by word or advice to check or accelerate those forces in European life which in 1914 were straining toward the war catastrophe, have suffered the greatest illusions with regard to these impulsive forces to fill their minds. Such personages were able to believe that a military victory of their country would pacify the social gusts and storms. Such personages have to recognize the fact, that in consequence of their social attitude the social impulses only broke every barrier that had hitherto resisted their appearance and revealed themselves in their totality. Nay, more, they have to recognize the fact that the present catastrophe of mankind has proven to be the historical

event through which these impulsive forces have received their full driving power. The leading personalities and classes had, in these last years so heavy with fate, constantly to make their actions dependent upon what was living in the socialistic circles of mankind. These leading personalities would very often have pursued quite a different course of action could they have ignored the dominant sentiment of the socialistic groups. In the form which events have now assumed, there still lives on the effects of this dominant sentiment.

And now that a decisive stage has been entered, of what, in gestation for decades, has arisen in the life-development of mankind, now it has become a tragic fate that the thoughts which have been born during the gestation of the presents facts of the world are no longer able to cope with the facts of life before them. Many personalities who have developed their ideas upon the growing embryo of the present facts in order to serve what lived as a social goal in these facts, are today imbecile or totally impotant with regard to the fateful questions that are propounded by the present day facts.

Many of these personalities indeed, still believe that what they now for many years have considered necessary for the new-ordering of human life will prove itself, when it is put in practice, mighty enough to give the loudly challenging facts a direction compatible with life. Let us ignore the opinion of those who today still fondly imagine that the old order of things can be maintained against the more recent demands of a large part of mankind—let us consider only the will of such as are convinced of the necessity for a new organization of life, and even when we take into consideration only these more progressive natures we cannot avoid acknowledging to ourselves: there are party principles wandering among us as judgment-mummies which have been rejected by the development of the facts. These facts demand decisions for which the judgments of the old parties are not prepared. These

parties, it is true, have developed concomitantly with the facts; but their habits of thinking have remained far in arrears of the facts. One probably need not be immodest in forming a judgment against views today still considered to be the measure of events, when one believes to have good and sufficient basis for this averse judgment in the course of the world's development in the present day; and when one draws the conclusion therefrom: precisely the present day ought to be receptive for the attempt to characterize that in the social life of more recent mankind, which, in its individuality, lies far beyond the habits of thought even of persons and parties with programs of social reform. For it is indeed possible that the tragedy, which is becoming evident in the attempted solutions of the social question, is in very truth rooted in a misunderstanding of the true striving of the proletariat developed out of proletarian struggles. For man by no means always forms a correct judgment of his own striving and volition.

One is quite justified, therefore, in putting the questions: What is the modern proletarian movement in truth really striving for? Does this, what the modern proletarian movement really wants, correspond with that which, either in proletarian or non-proletarian quarters, is commonly thought about this movement? Do the ideas that are generally held concerning the "social question" reveal the *true form* of the "social question"? Or is an entirely new direction of thought necessary in order to grasp the true form of this "question"? *These* questions cannot impartially and unbiasedly be considered by anyone, whose fate did not place him in conditions of life from which he was able to live himself into the living soul of the modern proletariat—into the breathing soul of that portion of the proletariat that is playing the greatest part in shaping the events which the social movement of the present day is causing.

Much has been said about the development of mod-

ern technique, of modern capitalism, and how that within this development the present proletariat has arisen, and how that the proletarian has come by its demands through the development of the more modern industrial life. In all that has been said in this regard very much is to the point. That the crux of the matter has nevertheless not been touched, can be grasped by him who refuses to be hypnotized by the prejudice that "external circumstances give to man the stamp of his character in life,"—but who preserves an unbiased view into those impulses of the soul which operate from out the inner depths. It is true that the proletarian demands have developed during the life of modern technique and modern capitalism. But the insight into this fact gives us no knowledge whatsoever concerning the much more important question, What, in these demands, really lives as *purely human* impulses? So long as one does not penetrate into the very life of these impulses, it is of course utterly impossible to get at the true form of the "social question".

A word, often uttered in the proletarian world, can make a tremendous impression upon him who is able to penetrate into the deeper lying impulsive forces of the human will—namely, the word, the modern proletarian has become *"class-conscious"*. He no longer follows the impulses of the classes above him, as it were, instinctively, unconsciously. He knows himself to be the member of a distinct class; and he is determined to establish the relationship of his class to the other classes in public life in a way favorable to his own interests. Whoever has a faculty for perceiving undercurrents of the soul, will have his attention called by this word "class-conscious", in the connection in which it is used by the modern proletarian, to most important facts in the social conception of life of those working classes that stand in the life of modern technique and modern capitalism. A person with such a faculty must, above all things, become aware how

scientific teachings with regard to economic life and its relation to human fate, have struck fire in the soul of the proletarian. This touches a fact concerning which many people, who are only able to think *about* the proletariat, but not *with* the proletariat, have only very vague and nebulous notions—notions that, in consideration of the very serious occurrences of the present day, are nothing less than noxious. The notion, the "uneducated" proletarian has had his head swelled by Marx and the writers following Marx, and such similar notions which one may often hear, prevent one from attaining an understanding of the historical situation of the world in this regard, which is adequate for the needs of the present day. For such an opinion only shows that one does not have the will to consider an essential feature in the present social movement. And such an essential feature is the filling of the proletarian class-consciousness with concepts that have taken their character from the more modern scientific development. In the proletarian class-consciousness there continues to live as a dominant tone, what lived in Lasalle's speech on "Science and the Workingman". Such things may seem of no consequence to many a person who considers himself a "practical man". But whoso wishes to gain a fruitful insight into the modern workingman's movement *must* direct his attention to such things. For in that which moderate and radical proletarians demand today, there does not live the economic life transformed into human impulses, as many persons suppose, but there lives the economic *science* by which the proletarian consciousness has been seized and filled. This fact appears so clear and unmistakable in the scientific tone of the popular journalism of the proletarian movement, that to deny it would be deliberately to close one's eyes to the real facts. And a fundamental fact, one that determines the social situation of the present day, is, that the modern proletarian suffers the content of his class-consciousness to be determined

by scientifically couched concepts. The man at the machine may have absolutely no connection with science; but he attentively listens to the explanation of his lot and condition by those who have received the means for such explanation from "science".

All the expositions concerning the more recent economic life, concerning the age of the machine, of capitalism, may with keen perception point out the hard and tangible facts that form the basis of the modern proletarian movement; but that which really and decisively clarifies the present social situation does not immediately flow from the fact that the workingman has been placed at the machine, that he has been harnessed into the capitalistic order of life, but out of the other fact, that very definite *thoughts* have developed within his class-consciousness at the machine and in dependence upon the capitalistic economic order. It may very well be that the habits of thought of the present era prevent many a man from completely grasping the far-reaching consequence of this lay of the facts, and persuade many another that the emphasis here placed upon this view of the facts is merely a dialectical play with concepts. With regard to this possibility must be said, so much the worse, then, for the prospects of a fruitful alignment with the social life of the present day on the part of those who are not able to grasp the essentials. Whoever wants to understand the proletarian movement must above all things know how the proletarian *thinks*. For the proletarian movement—from its moderate striving for reform to its most devastating excrescences—is not made by "superhuman forces" nor yet by "economic impulses", but by men and by their ideas, conceptions and volitional impulses.

Not in that, what the machine and capitalism have transplanted into the proletarian consciousness, do the determining ideas and volitional impulses of the present social movement lie; but this movement has sought its source of thought in the more modern trend of sci-

ence, because machine and capitalism could give to the proletarian nothing that was able to fill his soul with a content worthy of man. Such a content came to the craftsman of the middle ages out of his craft. In the way in which the craftsman felt himself *humanly* connected with his craft, there was something that made life within the entire human society appear in his consciousness in a light worthy of human life. His aspirations as a "human being" could be realized in the perfection of his craft. At the machine and within the capitalistic order of life man was thrown upon himself, upon his own inner life, when he sought a basis upon which a view, capable of bearing consciousness, as to what one is as a "man", could be built up. Technique and capitalism sent out from themselves nothing which could aid man in constructing such a view. Thus it happened that the proletarian consciousness came to follow the path toward scientifically toned thought, because it had lost the human connection with immediate life. This occurred, however, during the time in which the leading classes of mankind were striving toward a scientific manner of thought that itself no longer had sufficient spiritual driving force to give to the human consciousness a content able to satisfy all its needs. The old views of the world placed man as a soul in a spiritual connection of life. For the more modern science, man appears as a creature of nature within a purely natural order of the world. Modern science is not felt to be a stream flowing from the spirit-world, which carries the human being as a soul. No matter what opinion one may hold concerning the relation of the religious impulses and what is connected with them, to the scientific manner of thought of more modern time, one must, if one views the historic development unbiasedly, admit that the scientific concepts have developed out of religious representations. But the old Weltanschauungen, those resting on a religious substratum, have not been able to communicate their soul-carrying impulse to the

more modern scientific manner of thought. They placed themselves outside the pale of the scientific manner of thought and continued to live on with a content of consciousness to which the souls of the proletariat could not turn. To the leading classes this content of consciousness was still able to be of value. It was connected, in one way or another, with that which humanly bound them to and connected them with their position in life. These classes did not seek a new content of consciousness, because the traditions of their life itself allowed them to continue to hold the old content of consciousness. The modern proletarian was wrenched out of all the old connections of life. He is the man whose life has been placed upon a completely new basis. For him the destruction of the old basis of life also destroyed the possibility of drawing from the old spiritual sources, which were located in the midst of regions to which he had been made a stranger. With modern technique and modern capitalism there developed concomitantly—in the sense, of course, in which we may term the great historic currents of the world concomitant—the scientific attitude. To this the confidence and faith of the modern proletariat turned. In the scientific attitude he sought the new content of consciousness that had become a necessity for him. But the proletariat was placed in a different relation to this scientific attitude than was the relation of the leading classes. The leading classes did not feel the necessity of making the scientific method of thought their soul-bearing view of life. No matter how thoroughly they might embue themselves with the "scientific concept" that there is in the order of nature a straight causal connection from the lowest animals up to man—this concept remained a theoretical conviction, it did not create the desire to experience life emotionally also, in a way thoroughly in harmony with this conviction. The natural scientist Vogt, and the popularizer of natural science, Buechner, were both of them most assuredly saturated with the scientific

method of thought. But in addition to this scientific method of thought there was operative in their souls something that made them hold fast to life associations which can be rationally justified only by the belief in a spiritual order of the world. But consider, pray, without prejudice, how very different is the effect of the scientific spirit upon him whose own life is anchored in such life-associations from what it is upon the modern proletarian, who hears his agitator, in the few evening hours that are not occupied by labor, speak to him as follows: "Science has, in more recent times, exploded the old belief that men have their origin in spiritual worlds. Science has taught us that man, in primeval times, lived as a grinning, tree-climbing ape. Science has taught us that all men have the same purely natural origin." These are the thoughts that formed the loadstone toward which that scientific attitude was drawn, that scientific attitude which offered itself to the proletarian when he sought a content for his soul which should let him feel his human position in the world's being. The proletarian accepted this scientific attitude in all seriousness and without reserve, and drew from it *his* consequences for life. He was quite differently affected by the age of technique and capitalism than the members of the leading classes. The members of the leading classes were rooted in an order of life which was still shaped by soul-bearing impulses. They had every interest in harnessing the achievements of the new era within the confines of their order of life. The proletarian's soul had been wrenched from and torn out of this order of life. He could receive from this order of life nothing, no emotion whatsoever, which was able to illumine his life with a content worthy of man. To feel what one is as a man, could be gained and experienced by the proletarian only through the instrument of what of all the children of the old order of life seemed alone possessed of the power to inspire faith—the scientific attitude of thought.

Many a reader of these utterances may be impelled to smile by the reference to the "scientific" nature of proletarian concepts. Whoever is able by the words "scientific nature" to think only of that which one acquires by many years of sitting in an "educational institution", and who then opposes this "scientific attitude" to the content of consciousness of the "uneducated" proletarian, such an one may laugh. He laughs past facts of present day life which determine the future's fate. The facts of present day life prove that many an highly educated person *lives* unscientifically, while the uneducated proletarian orders his whole life and thought in accordance with scientific knowledge which he may not even possess. The educated man has accepted scientific knowledge; this knowledge lies in a pigeon-hole of his soul, able to be pulled forth on occasion; but the possessor of such knowledge stands amid associations of life and these determine his feelings and sentiments, which are not at all directed by scientific knowledge. The proletarian has been led by his conditions of life to conceive and apprehend his entire existence and being in a manner correspondent and in harmony with the *spirit* of scientific knowledge. What the other classes call "science" may be very remote from him; the fundamental attitude and direction of science direct his life. The other classes have a religious, an aesthetic, a general spiritual basis. The proletarian has "science", even though—as is very often the case—in its remotest foothills, as his faith in life. Many a member of the "leading" classes feels himself to be "enlightened", a "free thinker". Certainly, the scientific concepts have found entrance into his conceptual life; but in his emotions there pulsate the remains—quite unnoticed by himself—of an old traditional life-faith.

What the scientific method of thought did not receive as a dowry when it left the old order of life, is the consciousness: that it is a spiritual genus whose roots are in a spiritual world. The absence of the con-

sciousness of its sipiritual nature, in the modern scientific method of thought, did not disturb the members of the leading classes. They were able to disregard this lack, because their life was full of traditions. Not so the proletarian; for his new station in life drove all the old traditions out of his soul. He inherited the scientific method of thought from the ruling classes as a legacy. This legacy became the basis for his consciousness of the nature of man. But this "spiritual content" of his soul was quite ignorant of its origin in a *real* spirit life. What the proletarian was able to receive from the ruling classes in the way of spiritual life denied its origin out of the spirit.

I am not unconscious how these thoughts will affect non-proletarians as well as proletarians who fancy themselves "practically" acquainted with life, and who consider what has here been said as a view foreign to life. The facts that speak out of the present situation of the world will in ever increasing measure prove this, their opinion, to be a delusion. Whoever is able to view these facts without prejudice, will inevitably realize, that a view of life that is based solely on the externals of these facts will ultimately only be able to conceive ideas which have nothing whatsoever to do with the facts. The dominant thoughts have in all "practicality" clamped themselves so tightly to the facts so long, until these thoughts have no longer the slightest resemblance with these very facts. In this regard the present world catastrophe could be a disciplinarian for many. For: what did most people think, could happen? And what *did* happen? Is this the path that the social ideas shall also take?

I also hear, in spirit, the rejoinder that the confessor to a proletarian view of life will make out of his frame and dominant tone of soul: Another one of those who would like to shunt off the vital point of the social question on to a side-track, which seems easy to travel for those who have the middle-class habit of thought. Such a confessor does not comprehend how

fate gave him his proletarian life, and how he is trying to move about in this proletarian life by means of a manner of thinking which the "ruling" classes have given him as a legacy. He *lives* as a proletarian. But he *thinks* in a middle-class fashion. The new time, however, makes it necessary not only to find one's way into a new life, but also into *new thoughts*. The scientific manner of thought will only then become a life-bearing content, when it in its way shall have developed such vigor and driving force for forming a fully human content of life, as the old concepts of life have developed in their way.

With this, the way has been shown which leads to the finding of the "true form" of one of the organic links within the newer proletarian movement. At the end of this way there sounds from out the proletarian soul the conviction: I am striving after spiritual life; but this spiritual life is *ideology,* is only what is reflected from the external occurrences of the world, and does not flow out of a real and distinct spirit world. What, in the transition to the new time, has happened to the old spiritual life, is felt by the proletarian to be *ideology*. Whoever wants to comprehend the frame and dominant tone of the proletarian soul, which is living itself out in the social demands of the present day, must be in a position to grasp what effects can be caused by the view that the spiritual life is ideology. One may rejoin: What does the average proletarian know of this view, which haunts the minds of his more or less cultured leaders and throws them into confusion? Whoever says this talks over the heads of the facts of life and acts in total disregard of real life. Such an one does not know what has occurred in the proletarian life of the last decades; he does not know what threads spin themselves from the view, the spiritual life is ideology, to the demands and actions of the —in his opinion—"ignorant" radical socialist and also to the actions of those who, out of their dim and muffled life-impulses, "make revolutions".

Herein lies the tragedy that spreads itself over the comprehension of the social demands of the present, that so many circles have no feeling for that, which, out of the frame and dominant tone of soul of the broad masses, is forcing its way to the surface of life, viz., that we are not able to direct our view to that which is *really going on* in the souls of men. The non-proletarian listens, filled with fear, to the demands of the proletarians and hears: only by socializing the means of production can there be attained by us a life worthy of human beings. But this non-proletarian is unable to gain a conception of the circumstance that his class at the transition from the old into the new time, not only summoned the proletarian to work at the means of production which did not belong to him, but that these leading classes were unable to give to the proletarian at this work a content of soul with carrying power. People who, in the manner indicated above, talk and act in total disregard of life, may say: But the proletarian merely wants to be transferred into a condition of life similar to that of the ruling classes; where, pray, does the question concerning a content of soul come into consideration? Yes, the proletarian himself may assert, I do not demand from the other classes anything for my soul; what I want is that they be no longer able to exploit me. It is my desire that the existing differences between the classes cease. Such utterances, however, do not at all touch the vital points of the social question. They disclose nothing of the "true form" of this question. For a consciousness in the souls of the working people, which had inherited a true spirit-content, would have raised the social demands in a way entirely different from that of the modern proletariat which is able to see in the spiritual life it has received a mere ideology. The actual proletarian is convinced of the ideological character of the spirit life; and this conviction is making it more and more unhappy. And the effects and results of this its misfortune of soul—of which it con-

sciously knows nothing, but which in its hidden feelings and emotion it most intensely suffers—outweigh by far, in their importance for the social situation of the present day, all those factors which, however justified in their way they may be, present merely demands for a betterment in the external conditions of life.

The ruling classes do not recognize themselves as the authors and instigators of that manner of conceiving life, which in the present proletariat is standing forth ready to fight against them. But nevertheless the ruling classes have become the authors and instigators thereof, by the fact that they have been able to give only a portion of their spiritual heritage to the proletariat, that portion, namely, which of necessity must be felt by the proletariat to be ideology.

Not that is the important factor which gives to the present social movement its stamp, that demands for a change in the situation of life of an entire class of human beings are being made—although this would seem quite naturally to be the important factor—the really important factor is the way, how the demands for this change are converted from the thought-impulses of this class into reality. Let us, pray, look at the facts from this point of view without all prejudice. And we shall see how personalities who want to hold their thinking in the direction of the proletarian impulses, smile when mention is made of the attempt to make a contribution to the solution of the social question by means of this or that spiritual striving; they smile at such an attempt, call it ideology, a grey theory. Out of thought, out of the life of pure spirit, nothing whatsoever can possibly, in their opinion, be contributed toward relieving the burning social question of the present. But if one examines the matter more closely then one is forced to recognize *how* the real nerve, the really fundamental impulse of the modern, specifically of the proletarian movement, does **not** lie in that whereof the present day proletarian speaks, but lies in *thoughts*.

The modern proletarian movement is, as perhaps no other similar movement in the world—if one really examines the matter very closely this will become evident in the most decided sense of the word—a movement sprung from *thoughts*. I do not say this merely as an aperçu gained by reflection on the social movement. If I may be allowed to interpolate a personal remark, it is this: For years I was engaged in a workingman's school in giving instruction in the most varied branches of knowledge to proletarian workmen. I believe that I thereby learned to know what is living and active in the soul of the modern proletarian. From this point of departure I had occasion of pursuing what is operative in the trades unions of various fields and branches of labor. I am of the opinion: I do not speak from the point of view of theoretical ratiocinations, but I utter what I believe to have gained for myself as the result of real experience of life.

Whoever—what, more's the pity, is so seldom the case with leading men of intellect—whoever has learned to know the modern workingman's movement there where it is borne by *workingmen,* he knows what pregnant significance there is in an appearance such as *this;* that a certain *direction* of thought has seized in the most intense way the souls of a great number of men. What causes the difficulty at present of taking a stand with regard to the social riddles, is, that the possibility of mutual understanding between the classes is so small. The middle classes of today have such a very great difficulty in putting themselves into the soul of the proletarian; it is so very difficult for them to understand, how that there could find entrance into the virgin and still unexhausted *intelligence* of the proletariat such a — one may think of the content as one likes—such a manner of conception, one placing the very highest demands upon human thinking capacity, as is the manner of conception of Karl Marx.

Of course, Karl Marx's system of thought can be

accepted by one person, and can be refuted by the second, and very likely the one can be done with as good show of reason as the other; it was able to be revised by those who, after Marx's and Engels' death, regarded the social life from a different point of view than these leaders. Of the content of this Marxian system I shall make no mention whatsoever. This content does not seem to me to be the important consideration in the modern proletarian movement. The most important consideration seems to me to be the presence of the *fact*: Within the working class there is operative as the most powerful impulse, a system of thought. We may in truth put the matter in the following form: a practical movement, a pure life-movement with most matter of fact human demands, has never yet until now stood so exclusively upon a basis of *pure* thought as this modern proletarian movement. This movement is, in a certain sense, the very first of such movements in the history of the world that has placed itself purely on a scientific basis. Nevertheless, when one considers all that which the modern proletarian has to say about his own opinions and will and feelings, this what he says does not, on very careful observation, appear to be the important matter.

Of real importance, however, is the fact that in the feeling of the proletarian there has become determinant and decisive for the *whole* man that which in the other classes is anchored in a single member merely of their soul life: the *thought-basis* of mind and life. What in this manner is inner reality in him, the proletarian cannot consciously acknowledge it. He is prevented from acknowledging this, because of the circumstance that the life of thought has been transmitted to him as an ideology. The proletarian, in point of fact, builds his whole life on thoughts and a thought-foundation; but has the feeling that thoughts are unreal ideology. In no other wise can one understand the proletarian conception of life and the attempt of the proletarians to put it into practice than by a comprehension of *this*

fact in its full significance for the development of more recent mankind.

Out of the way in which in the preceding, the spiritual life of the modern proletarian has been described, one can recognize that in the presentation of the true form of the proletarian-social movement, the delineation of the distinguishing features of this spiritual life must appear in the first instance. For no matter what the causes may be for the condition of life which is found to be not satisfactory by the proletarian feeling, the proletarian feels these causes and strives for their removal in a way that is determined as to its direction by this spiritual life. And still the proletarian can at present not do otherwise than reject the opinion with scoffing or scorn that there is in these spiritual substrata of the social movement something that represents a very important driving force. How is he to recognize that the spiritual life has a power that drives him on, when he must necessarily have the feeling that it is mere ideology? Of a spiritual life, which is felt in this way, can not be expected that it will find the way out of a social situation which one is determined to endure no longer. Out of his scientific direction of thought the modern proletarian has had not only science itself, but also art, religion, morals, justice, become integral parts of human ideology. He sees in that which lives in these branches of the spiritual life, nothing of a reality that is breaking into his life, a reality able to add something to material life. For him all these branches of the spiritual life are merely the after-glow or reflection of this material life. Granted that they may, after they have come into existence, re-act upon this life in a round-about way through human representation or by being taken up into the volitional impulses; originally they arise, in his opinion, as ideological forms out of economic life. Not *they* can give from themselves anything which leads to the solution of the social difficulties. Only *within* the ma-

terial facts themselves can anything arise which leads to the goal.

The newer spiritual life has been passed on from the leading classes of mankind to the proletarian population in a form which blots this spiritual life out of consciousness, when thought is taken concerning the forces which are able to bring about the solution of the social question. Were this fact to remain operative further, the spiritual life of mankind would inevitably see itself doomed to impotence with regard to the social demands of the present and future. Of this belief in the impotence of the spiritual life is in very truth a large part of the modern proletariat convinced; and this conviction is given expression in Marxian or similar faiths. One says, modern economic life has developed out of its older forms the capitalism of the present day; this development has brought the proletariat into a situation with reference to capital which cannot be endured. The development will go on further; it will destroy capitalism by means of the forces that are operative in capitalism itself, and out of the death of capitalism there will arise the liberation of the proletariat. This conviction has been robbed by more recent socialistic thinkers of the fatalistic character it had assumed for a certain circle of Marxians. But even for these more recent socialistic thinkers the essential feature of the Marxian turn of mind has remained. This expresses itself in the fact that it will not occur to him who wants to *think* in a genuinely socialistic way at the present day to say: if anywhere, born out of the impulses of the time, rooted in a spiritual reality and bearing mankind, a soul-life shall show itself, it will then be possible that there radiate from it the power which shall also give to the social movement the proper driving force.

That the person of the present day who is compelled to lead a proletarian life cannot entertain such expectations of the spiritual life of the present, this gives to his soul its basic tone. He has need of a spir-

itual life, from which the power radiates, which gives to his soul the feeling of its human worth. For when he was harnessed into the capitalistic economic order of the newer time, he was directed with the deepest requirements of his soul to such a spiritual life. That spiritual life, however, which the leading classes transmitted to him as ideology, hollowed out his soul. That in the demands of the modern proletariat there is operative a longing for a different connection with the spiritual life than the present order of society is able to give, this gives to the present social movement its directive power. But this fact is correctly grasped neither by the non-proletarian part of mankind nor by the proletarian. For the non-proletarian does not suffer under the ideological character of the modern spiritual life, which he himself has called into existence. The proletarian suffers under it; but this ideological character of the spiritual life that has been given to him as a legacy, has robbed him of the faith in the carrying power of the spiritual forces as such. Upon the proper insight into this fact is dependent the finding out of a way which is able to lead out of the tangles of the present social situation of mankind. The social order which has come into existence under the influence of the leading classes of mankind at the dawn of the newer form of economic life, has barred the approach to such a way. *One shall have to gain the strength to open it.*

One will think in this field, quite different ideas from those now being thought, when one learns correctly to feel the weight of the fact that the life of men in a social order in which the spiritual life works as ideology, lacks one of the powers which makes the social organism able to live. The present social organism suffers and is sick with the impotence of the spiritual life. And the malady is aggravated by the disinclination to recognize its existence. By recognizing this fact, one will gain a basis upon which a type of

thinking corresponding to the social movement can unfold itself.

At present the proletarian thinks he is touching upon a basic power of his soul when he speaks of his *class-consciousness*. But the truth is, that since his being harnessed into the capitalistic economic order he is searching for a spiritual life which can bear his soul, which will give to him the *consciousness of his human worth;* and that the spiritual life which he feels to be ideology cannot unfold to him this consciousness of his human worth. He has sought for this consciousness and has surrogated what he could not find, with the *class-consciousness* born out of economic life.

His view has been directed, as if by a mighty suggestive force, solely to economic life. And now he no longer believes it possible that there can lie in a spirit or soul element the active impulse for that which ought, in the necessities of the case, occur in the domain of the social movement. He only believes that through the development of the unspiritual, unsoulful economic life, *that* condition is to be obtained which *he* feels to be worthy of man. And so he was forced to seek his salvation only in the reconstruction of economic life. He was forced into the opinion that through mere reorganization of economic life there would disappear all the evils which arise out of private enterprise, out of the egoism of the individual employer, and out of the inability of the individual employer to do justice to those demands for human consideration which live in the workman. And so the modern proletarian came to see the only salvation of the social organism in the transferrence of all private possession of the means of production into *socialistic production* or even into communal ownership. Such an opinion came into existence because people have diverted their attention from all elements of soul and spirit and have *only* directed their view to the purely economic process.

Because of this, a fact of great importance appeared,

which shows precisely how many contradictory elements there are in the modern proletarian movement. The modern proletarian believes that industry, the economic life itself, is bound to develop in such a way that he will at last receive his full rights as a human being. For his full rights as a human being, is he fighting. But within his striving something turns up which, it is evident, can never occur as an effect of the economic life alone. This is an important fact, a fact that speaks a language which penetrates to the marrow: that at the very center of the various forms which the social question has assumed out of the life necessities of present mankind, there lies something of which people believe it comes forth out of the economic life itself, but which could not possibly have arisen out of economic life *alone,* which on the contrary lies in the straight line of development that leads over the old slave economy through feudal bondage to the modern working proletariat. However, for modern life, the circulation of goods, the circulation of money, the nature of capital, private property, the nature of land and land rent may have taken shape, *within* this modern life something has developed which is not clearly expressed, neither is consciously felt by the modern proletarian, but which is the real basic impulse of his social will. It is this: the modern capitalistic order of industry knows, in the last analysis, only wares within its domain. The capitalistic industrial order recognizes the determination of value for these wares within the economic organism. And within the capitalistic organism of more recent time, something has become a *ware,* concerning which the proletarian has the feeling: it *may* not be a ware.

When one shall recognize how strong this operates as one of the basic impulses of the whole modern proletarian social movement, that in the instincts, in the sub-conscious emotions of the modern proletarian there lives a horror and a repugnance against having to sell his working power to the employer in the same

way as one sells a ware on the market, that he is horrified to feel that his working power is subject to the same conditions of supply and demand on the labor market as wares are subject to supply and demand on the open market, when one discovers what importance this horror of the ware, working-power, has for the modern social movement, when one shall view without all prejudice the fact that what is here operative has not been characterized poignantly and radically enough even by the socialistic theories, then we shall have found to the first impulse, the feeling that the spiritual life is ideology, the second impulse, concerning which we must say that it is making of the social question today an importionate, yes, a burning question.

In ancient times there were slaves. The *entire* man was sold as a ware. Something less of man, but still a portion of the human nature itself, was integrated into the economic process through feudal serfdom. Capitalism has become the power which still places the stamp of a ware on a remainder of human nature; the working power. I do not want to give the impression here that this fact has not been noticed. On the contrary, it is felt in the social life of the present, to be a fundamental fact. It is felt to be something that is working with the utmost importance and weight in the modern social movement. But one casts his view, in considering this fact, solely upon economic life. One makes the question of human working power as a ware, into a purely economic question. One is of the opinion, that out of economic life itself the powers must come which bring to pass a condition in which the proletarian no longer feels the integration of his working-power in the the social organism as unworthy of his nature. One sees how the modern form of industry has arisen in the more recent historical development of mankind. One also sees that this form of industry has stamped the human working-power with the character of a ware. But one does not

see that it is economic life itself that inevitably and necessarily *must* make everything that is an integral part of it a *ware*. The economic process consists in the production and purposeful consumption of wares. One cannot divest human working-power of its character as a ware, if one does not find the possibility of wrenching it out of the economic process. Not toward the reconstruction of the economic process so that human working-power receives its due *within* it, can our striving be directed, but toward solving the question: How can one get human working-power out of the economic process, in order to have this working-power determined by social forces which take from it its character of a ware? The proletarian longs for a condition of economic life in which his working-power occupies the position due it. He longs for this condition because he does not see that the character of a ware of his working-power results from his being completely harnessed in the economic process. Because of the fact that he has to hand over to the economic process his working-power, he is completely swallowed up with his whole being in the economic process. The economic process through its innate character strives to consume working-power in the most efficient way, in the way most suited to its purpose, even as it consumes wares. As if hynotized by the power of modern economic life, people direct their attention and view only toward that which is capable of operating in this economic process. One will never find in this direction of search how working-power no longer need be a ware. For a different economic form will also make of this working-power a ware, only by other means. This question of human labor can not in its true form be made a part of the social question so long as one does not see that in economic life the production of wares, the exchange of wares, and the consumption of wares, proceed according to laws which are determined by interests whose field of sway may not be extended over human working-power.

Modern thinking has not learned to separate the very different ways in which on the one hand that is integrally connected with the economic process what is tied to man as working-power, and on the other hand that which, according to its origin, moves disconnected from man upon the ways which a ware must take from its production until its consumption. A sound manner of thinking directed in this direction will disclose the true form of the labor question on the one hand, and the same sound thinking directed in the other direction will disclose, on the other hand, what position the economic life as a whole ought to occupy in a healthy social organism.

One already sees from this, that the "social question" resolves itself into three separate questions. In the first we shall have to consider the sound form of the spiritual life in the social organism; in the second we shall have to consider the relation of work in its proper function within the social life; and in the third we shall be led to consider how economic life ought to operate within the social life.

CHAPTER II.

The Attempts Demanded by Life in Accordance with Reality to Solve the Social Questions and Necessities.

THE specific element which has brought about this particular and peculiar form of the social question in more recent time, can probably be expressed in *this* way, that one says: Economic life borne by technique, modern capitalism, they have operated in a certain matter-of-course manner, as if by nature, and have brought modern society into a particular condition of internal order. Side by side with the riveting of the human attention to that which technique and capitalism have achieved, there has gone a diversion of the attention from other branches, other fields of the social organism, which just as imperatively need to have their proper function determined by the human consciousness, if the social organism is to be healthy and sound.

I may, in order to say clearly what shall here be characterized as driving impulses of a comprehensive, all-around survey of the social question, possibly be allowed to use a comparison as the point of departure. But it must be kept in mind that with this comparison nothing else is meant than a comparison that can aid the human comprehension, in order to bring it in precisely the direction that is necessary, in order to form concepts concerning the restoration of health to the social organism. He, who from the point of view here taken, must observe the most complicated of natural organisms, the human organism, must direct his atten-

tion to this fact, that the entire nature of this human organism rests upon the circumstance that this organism shows three systems working side by side, each of which operates with a certain independence. These three systems that work side by side can be characterized somewhat as follows: In the human natural organism there works as one department that system, which comprises within itself nerve-life and sense-life. And we may call it, after the most important member of the organism, where nerve-life and sense-life are in a certain sense centralized, the head-organism.

As second member of the human organization we have to recognize, if we want to acquire a real understanding of this human organization, that which I should like to call the rhythmic system, which hangs together with *breathing, blood-circulating,* with all that which expresses itself in rhythmic proceedings of the human organism.

As third system we have then to recognize all that which as organs and activities hangs together with the *actual assimilation.* In these three systems, when organized to one another, is contained all that which in a healthy manner supports the entire procedure which is carried on in the human organism.

I have tried, in full accord with all that what the research of the natural sciences is able to say today, to characterize in brief outline, at least for the present, this triorganation of the human natural organism.*) I am clearly cognizant for myself, that all that what biology, physiology, what natural science will bring to light in the immediate future with regard to man, will directly lead to such a view of the human organism, to a view which thoroughly sees how these three members—head system, circulatory or breast system, and assimilatory system—thereby maintain the entire pro-

*) Concerning Riddles of the Soul. Goetheanum Press, 46 Hendrie St., Detroit.

cedure in the human organism, in that they operate in a certain independence, that an absolute centralization of the human organism does not obtain, and that each of these systems also has a separate and independent relation to the external world, viz., the head system through the senses, the circulatory, the rhythmic system through the breathing, and the assimilatory system through the organs of nutrition.

Our methods of research in the natural sciences are not yet far enough advanced—what for the progress of knowledge would be very desirable—to bring to general recognition within the realm of natural science itself, the facts that I have tried to make accessible to the natural sciences out of the depths of spiritual science. This means, however: our habits of thought, our whole way of conceiving the world, are not yet fully adapted to and on a par with that which, for example, presents itself in the human organism as the inner essense of the working of nature. It were possible to say with regard to this fact: Well, natural science can wait; science slowly but surely pursues its ideals, and it will eventually arrive at the point where it can recognize such way of conceiving the world as its own. But with reference to the correct survey and especially with reference to the workings of the social organism, it is impossible to wait. With regard to this matter, not only a select few men of science, but every human soul—for every human soul takes part in the activity of the social organism—must have at least an instinctive knowledge of that which is necessary for this social organism. A sound thinking and feeling, a healthy willing and desiring with regard to the shaping of the social organism, can only develop when one clearly realizes, even though in a more or less instinctive way merely, that this social organism, if it is to be sound, must be just as triorganic as the natural organism.

Attempts have been made, since Schäffle wrote his book about the structure of the social organism, to hunt up analogies between the organization of a

natural being,—say, the organization of man—and the human society as such. People have tried to determine what the cell is in the social organism, what groups of cells are, what cellular-structure is, and so forth! And only a short time ago a book by Merey appeared, "Weltmutation," in which certain facts and laws of natural science are simply transferred to—as one supposed—the social organism of man. With all these things, with all such toying with analogies, that what is here meant, has absolutely nothing whatsoever in common. And whoever is of the opinion that this book is also merely such a toying with analogies between the natural and the social organism, only proves thereby that he has not at all entered into the spirit of what is here set forth. Not at all has here been striven: to transfer any truth whatsoever, that holds for the facts of natural science, onto the social organism; but the radically different matter, of having the human thinking, the human feeling, learn, by observation of the organism that is subject to nature, to feel wherein the ability to live consists, and then of being able to apply this insight to the consideration of the social organism. If one simply transfers what one imagines to have learned concerning the natural organism to the social organism, as is often done, one only shows that one is unwilling to acquire the ability to study the social organism and as independently and carefully to search for its own laws, as is necessary in order to gain an understanding of the natural organism. On the instant when one sets to work in the same objective manner in which the natural scientist observes the natural organism, and considers the social organism according to its peculiar and individual and independent nature, at this instant there ceases, in view of the seriousness of the observation, every toying with analogies.

One might also think, the exposition here given is based upon the belief: the social organism ought to be "constructed" according to some theory or other

that is modelled after natural science. But this lies as far removed from what is here said, as is at all possible. Quite other things shall be pointed out. The present historical crisis of mankind demands, that certain *feelings* come to life *in every single human being,* that the stimulation for these feelings be given by the educational and school system, just as those for learning the four arithmetical operations. What up to the present and without conscious reception in the human soul has caused the old forms of social structure, will no longer be operative in the future. It is part of the evolutionary impulses, which from the present on want to enter into human life anew, that the feelings referred to are demanded of the individual human, as for a long time now a certain educational method is demanded. That he learn to feel in a sound manner, how the forces of the social organism ought to work in order to give this organism the possibility of life, this, from the present on, is demanded of each human being. One shall have to acquire a feeling for the fact, that it is unhealthy, antisocial, *not* to want to take one's place in the social organism with such feelings.

Today, we hear "socialization" spoken of as that which the time needs. This socialization will be no healing process but a quack cure for the social organism, possibly even a process of destruction, if there does not enter into human hearts and human souls at least the *instinctive* knowledge of the necessity for the *Triorganation of the Social Organism.* This social organism must, if it is to work in a healthy manner, develop according to the laws inherent in each, three such organs.

One of these organs is the economic life. Here we shall start by considering it, because in a way most patent and dominating the remainder of life, by means of modern technique and modern capitalism, it has forced and formed itself into the human society. This economic life must be an organ for itself within the social organism, an organ so relatively independent as the nerve and sense-system in the human organism is relatively

independent. The actions of this economic life are all those activities which pertain to the production of wares, to the circulation of wares, and to the consumption of wares.

As *second organ* of the social organism must be considered the life of public right, the political life properly speaking, that which, in the sense of the old juristic state, might be designated as state-life properly so called. While the economic life is concerned with all what man needs from nature and out of his own production, i. e., with wares, the circulation of wares, and the consumption of wares, this second organ of the social organism can be active only in all that which out of purely human sources has reference to the relation of man to man. It is essential for the knowledge of the organs of the social organism, that one knows, what difference obtains between the system of public right, which system can only be concerned out of purely human sources with the relation of man to man, and the economic system, which system *only* is concerned with the production of wares, the circulation of wares, the consumption of wares. One must with his feeling make this difference in life, in order that as a result of this feeling, the economic life and the life of public justice separate, even as in the human natural organism the activity of the lungs for manipulation of the outer air separates itself from the proceedings in the nerve-sense-life.

As third organ, which in just as independent a manner must take its place beside the other two organs, one has to consider all that of the social organism, which has reference to the spiritual life. More precisely one may say, because probably the term "spiritual culture" or "everything which has reference to cultural life," is not in all points exact: all that, which rests upon the natural ability of each individual human individual, which must enter into the social organism on the basis of this natural, both spiritual and physical ability of the individual human individual. Just as the first system, the economic system, is concerned with all that, which must be here, in order

that man be able to regulate his material relationship to the external world, and while the second is concerned necessarily with all that, which must be present in the social organism because of the relation of man to man, is the third system concerned with all that, which must spring forth and which must be organized into the social organism out of the individual human individuality.

As true as it is, that modern technique and modern capitalism have given our social life, as a matter of fact in very recent time, its distinctive stamp, so necessary is it that those wounds, which have necessarily been caused from this side to human society, be healed thereby, that the individual human and *human social life* be brought into a proper relation to that, which may be characterized as the three organs of this social organism. The economic life has—simply through itself—in more recent time assumed very particular forms. It has through a one-sided activity taken its place in human life in a particularly powerful manner. The other two organs of the social life have up till now not been in a position to organize themselves into the social organism in the proper way with the same matter-of-factness. For them it is necessary, that man, out of the feelings referred to above, undertake the social organization, each individual at the point where he stands. For in the sense of the attempts at solving the social question, which are here meant, every single human being has his task in the present and in the immediate future.

That, which is the first organ of the social organism, the economic life, that rests in the first instance upon the basis furnished by nature, even as the individual human, with reference to that which he can become for himself through learning, through education and through living, is dependent upon the native ability of his spiritual and physical organism. This basis furnished by nature simply impresses upon economic life, and thereby upon the whole social organism, its stamp. But this basis furnished by nature is given, and cannot be affected in its original condition by any social organiza-

tion, by any socialization. It must be used as the foundation for the social organism as, in the education of a human being, the foundation must be used which is given in the native ability he has in the various fields, his natural physical and spiritual efficiency. Every socialization, every attempt to give the living together of human beings an economic configuration, must take into account the basis furnished by nature. For at the basis of all circulation of wares and also of all human work and also of all cultural life of whatever sort, there lies as a first, elementary, and primal source and element that which binds man to a particular piece of nature. One must think of the connection of the social organism with the basis furnished by nature, as in the matter of learning by an individual one has to think of his relation to his ability. One can straightway make this clear by extreme examples. One need only consider, for instance, that in certain regions of the earth, where the banana furnishes a food-stuff ready to hand for human beings, there comes into consideration for the living-together of human beings so much work as must be expended, in order to bring the banana from its place of origin to a place of destination and make of it an article of consumption. If one compare the human labor that must be expended in order to make the *banana* an article of consumption for a human sciety, with the work that must be expended, say in the region of middle Europe to make wheat an article of human consumption, the work required by the banana is—at a very low estimate—at least three hundred times less than that required by wheat.

Of course, this is an extreme case, but such differences with reference to the necessary amount of work in relation to the basis furnished by nature, are also present under the branches of production represented in any social organism of Europe [or of America (the translator)]—not in this radical difference as with banana and wheat—but they are present as differences. So is it fundamental to the economic organism that by

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the relation of man to the natural basis of his economic activity the amount of labor power is determined which he has to carry into the economic process. And one need only, for example, compare: in Germany, in regions of average fertility, the yield of the wheat-culture is such that approximately the seven or eight-fold of the seed is harvested; in *Chile* the *twelve-fold* is harvested; in *northern Mexico* the seventeen-fold; in *Peru* the twenty-fold. (Cf. Jentsch: Volkswirtschaftslehre, p. 64.)

This entire being in all its connections, which runs its course in proceedings which begin with the relation of man to nature, which are continued in all that, which man has to do in order to transform the natural products and bring them to the point where they are ready for consumption, all these proceedings and only these comprise for a healthy social organism, the economic organ of this organism. This economic organ stands in the social organism as the head-system, by which the individual abilities are determined, stands in the complete human organism. But just as this head-system is dependent upon the system of the lungs and heart, so is the economic system dependent upon the productivity of human labor. But just as the head cannot of itself independently bring forth the regulations of the breathing, even so ought the regulation of human labor not be effected by those forces of themselves, which are operative in the economic life.

In the economic life man stands by the fact of his interests which have their basis in the demands of his soul and spirit. How these interests can most effectively be met within a social organism, so that the individual human being may through this social organism in the best manner possible attain the satisfaction of his interests, and so that he may also in the most advantageous manner assume his place in the economic world; this question must be solved practically in the arrangements of the economic organ. This is only possible through this means: that the interests be able to make themselves felt in a really free manner, and also that the will and

possibility arise to do all that is necessary to satisfy these interests. The origin of the interests lies outside the circle that marks the boundary of the economic life. They come into existence and take shape with the development of the soul and natural being of man. That arrangements arise to satisfy these interests, is the task of the economic life. These institutions can be concerned with nothing else than solely with the production and exchange of wares, that is, of goods which receive their value through human requirements. A ware receives its value through him who consumes it. Because of the fact that a ware receives its value through the consumer, it stands in the social organism in an entirely different manner than other things which have value to man as a member of this social organism. Whoever observes without prejudice the economic life, in the sphere of which the production of wares, the exchange of wares, and the consumption of wares belong, he will notice the *essential* difference not *merely* as a spectator, that exists between the relation of man to man when one man produces wares for another, and that other relation which must be founded upon a relation of rights; but he will advance from the observation of this difference to the practical demand: in the social organism the life of right must be kept completely separate from the economic life. Out of the activities which men have to develop within the institutions that serve the production and exchange of wares, it is not possible that there will immediately come into existence the best possible impulses for the relations of right which must obtain among men. Within the economic arrangements man seeks man because the one serves the interest of the other; fundamentally different herefrom is the relation which one human being has to the other human being within the life of right.

One might now believe, this differentiation demanded by life were sufficiently taken into account, if, within the institutions which serve the economic life, care is also taken for those rights, which must exist in the rela-

tions of the people who are placed in this economic life. Such a belief does not have its roots in the reality of life. Man can only then experience the relation of rights, properly, the relation that must obtain between himself and other human beings, if he experiences this relation *not* on the economic plane, but on a basis completely separated therefrom. Therefore, there must, in the sound social organism, come into existence *beside* the economic life and in independence therefrom a life, in which human rights come into existence and are administered, the rights that obtain from man to man. The life of right, however, is that of the political sphere in the true sense of the word, the life of the state. If human beings carry those interests which they must necessarily serve in their economic life, into the law-making and administration of the state, i. e., of the organ of human rights and justice, then the rights that come into existence under these circumstances will only be the expression of these economic interests. And if the state itself becomes economist, it loses the ability to regulate the rights of human living, for its measures and institutions will under these conditions necessarily have to serve the human desire for wares; these measures will thereby be diverted from the impulses which are directed toward the rights of human living.

The sound social organism demands as a second organ beside the economic body, the independent political state life. In the independent economic body men will —through the force of economic life—come to arrangements and institutions which serve the production of wares and the exchange of wares in the best possible way; in the body formed by the political state, such institutions will arise which will adjust the mutual relations between human beings and groups of human beings in such a manenr that the consciousness of justice of man will be taken into account.

The point of view from which the demand just characterized for the complete separation of the political state from the domain of economics, is here put forth,

is a point of view that actually exists in *real* human life. Such a point of view is not held by him who wants to unite the life of human rights with the economic life. The people who are in the economic life have of course a consciousness of right; but they will take care of law-making and the administration of laws in accordance with their consciousness of right and *solely* out of this consciousness and not out of their economic interests, when they have to judge concerning these matters in the corporation of rights, which as such, has no part in the economic life. Such a corporation for the establishing and maintenance of human rights has its own law-making and administrative bodies, both of which are built up upon the principles which arise from the consciousness of right of the more recent time. This political state will be built up on those impulses in human consciousness which at present are called the democratic impulses. The economic domain will build up out of the impulses of economic life, its law-making and administrative bodies. The necessary communication between the *directories* of the political and the economic bodies will be carried on much as is at present the communication between the governments of sovereign states. Through this separation it will come to pass that what develops in the one body will be able to exert the necessary influence upon that which arises in the other body. This mutual influencing is prevented, when the one domain tries to develop within itself that which it ought to receive from the other domain.

Just as the economic life on the one side is subject to the conditions furnished by nature (climate, geographic nature of the region, presence of natural resources, etc.), so on the other side it is dependent upon the relations of human rights which the state establishes between the men and groups of men engaged in economic activity. Herewith the limits have been drawn, of that which the activity of the economic life may and ought to comprise. Just as nature creates primal conditions which lie outside the circle of economics and which the

economic activity of man must accept as something given upon which he may then first build up his economy, so ought everything which establishes a relation of rights from man to man for the economic sphere, receive its regulation in the sound social organism, through the corporation for establishing and maintaining human rights, through the state, which, just as the basis furnished by nature, must enfold itself with reference to economic life, as an independent organ.

In the social organism that has developed in the history of mankind thus far and which has—through the age of the machine and through the modern capitalistic economy—become that which gives to the social movement its distinctive stamp, the economic life includes within its domain more activities than in a healthy social organism it ought. At present there courses within the economic circulation, in which only *wares* ought to circulate, human labor, and there also courses human rights. It is possible at present within the economic structure that rests upon a division of labor, not only to exchange wares for wares, but also by means of the very same economic process, to exchange wares for human labor and to exchange wares for human rights. (I call a ware everything, which has through human activity become that as which it—at any place whatsoever to which it is brought by man—is brought to consumption. Even though this definition may seem awkward or inadequate to many a teacher of economics, it will be able—for an understanding of that which ought to belong to the economic process—to do good service.) If anyone acquires a piece of land by purchase, this transaction must be considered as an exchange of the land for wares—for which wares the money paid in purchase serves as a representative. But the plot of ground itself does not hold the position of nor act as a ware within economic life. It occupies its position in the social organism by virtue of the *right* which the individual has to use it. This right is something essentially different from the relation that the producer of a ware has to the ware

which he produces. In this latter relation there exists as an essential factor thereof, the fact that this relation does not extend into the relation of man to man, which is of an entirely different order and which comes into existence through the fact that someone has the exclusive right to use a piece of land. The person who possesses such an exclusive right, by this simple fact brings other persons, who to earn their living must accept employment by him in working on it, or who have to live upon it, into dependence upon himself. In the fact of really mutually exchanging wares, which one produces or consumes, such a dependence does not come into existence which operates in this same way between man and man.

Whoever unbiasedly observes and grasps such a fact of life, will be convinced that such a fact must find its expression in the arrangements of the sound social organism. So long as wares are exchanged for wares in economic life, the regulation of the value of these wares remains independent of the relation of rights between persons and groups of persons. As soon as wares are exchanged for rights, the relation of right that must obtain between men, itself is affected. The crucial point is not the exchange as such—this is the necessary life-element of the present social organism based as it is upon a division of labor—but the crux of the matter is, that through the exchange of rights for wares, right itself is made into a ware if the right comes into existence *within* economic life. This is only prevented thereby that within the social organism on the one hand there be arrangements which *only* have as their purpose the bringing about of the most efficient circulation of wares possible; and on the other hand that there be institutions which regulate the rights which live in the exchange of wares of producing, trading and consuming people. *These* rights differ in their essence not at all from other rights which must exist in that relation of person to person which is quite independent of the exchange of wares; whether I harm or help my fellow men through the sale

of a ware, this belongs in the same domain of social life as an injury or a favor caused by an action which finds no immediate expression in an exchange of wares.

In the life economy of the individual person, the workings of the institutions of right flow together with those of the purely economic activity; in the sound social organism they must come from two different directions. In the economic organization, the intimate acquaintance with and thorough knowledge of economic activity gained by education for a particular branch of industry and by practical experience in it, must furnish the necessary points of view for the leading personalities. In the organization of right, law and administration must establish what is demanded by the consciousness of right in the way of (legal) relations between individual persons or groups of persons to one another. The economic organization will allow people with like professional or consumptive interests or who have like requirements in some other respect, to join together to form co-operative associations which in mutual trafficking will maintain the entire economic life. This organization will be built up upon an associative basis and upon the relationship of associations. These associations will develop a purely economic activity. The legal basis (that is the relation of human rights), which is fundamental to their activity, is given them by the organization of right (the state, that is). If such economic associations can secure recognition for their economic interests in the representative and administrative bodies of the economic organization, then they will not develop the tendency to force their way into the law-making or administrative control of the political state (e. g., as League of Farmers,[1] as the Party of Industrial Magnates,[1] as Social-Democracy[1] with economic purposes) in order to try to effect by this means, what is not possible for them to attain within the economic life. And if the state, which cares for human rights, be engaged in no economic activity what-

[1] Parties in German political life.

soever, then it will create only such arrangements as spring out of the consciousness of right of the people who belong to it. Even if in the representation of the state, which cares for human rights, as is of course natural and to be expected, the same persons have seats, who are active in economic life, there will not result, because of the radical separation of the economic life from the political life, an influencing of the political life by the economic life which so undermines the health of the social organism, as this health can be undermined when the organization of the state itself takes care of branches of economic life, or as this health is undermined when the representatives of the economic life pass laws out of the interests of this economic life.

A typical example of the fusion of economic life with the life of right, was presented by Austria with the constitution which it gave itself in the sixties of the nineteenth century. The representatives of the Reichsrat of this domain of territories were elected from the four branches of the economic life, from the association of large land owners, from the chambers of commerce, from the cities, trading centers and industrial places, and from the country communes. It is apparent, for the make-up of this representation of the state, nothing else was thought of in the first instance, than that by balancing the economic relations there would result a life of right. It is certainly true, that in bringing about the present disintegration of Austria the centrifugal forces of the various nationalities played an important part. But it may be considered as just as certain that an organization of right, which could have unfolded its activity beside the economic organization, would have developed out of the consciousness of right of the people, a form for the social organism in which a living-together of the various peoples would have been possible.

The person at present interested in public life usually directs his view to things which only come into consideration in the second instance for this life. He does this, because his habits of thought lead him to conceive the

social organism as an unitarian structure. For *such* a structure, however, it is impossible to find a suitable method of election. For in *every* method or scheme of election, a representative body will result in which the economic impulses and the impulses for human rights must necessarily conflict. And what flows out of this conflict, *must* lead to upheavals in the social organism. First and foremost as the necessary goal of public life at present, is the working toward a thoroughgoing separation of economic life from the organization which cares for human rights. In the act of living into this separation, the separating organizations will find, out of their own fundamental situations, the best methods for the election of their law-makers and administrators. In what is now pressing for a decision, questions as to the method of election, even though they as such are of fundamental importance, are matters which must be considered in the second instance. Where the old relations still exist, it is in order to work out of the existing conditions the separation here outlined. Where the old order has already dissolved, or is in process of dissolution, individuals and associations of individuals have the task of attempting the initiative for a new formation which moves in the direction indicated. To desire to bring about a complete change in public life from one day to the next, even reasonable socialists realize this to be a fantastic ideal. And such persons expect the convalescence of society for which they hope, by a gradual change, case by case. But that the historical forces of development of mankind at present make necessary a reasonable *willing* as to the direction of the social reorganization, every unprejudiced person can learn this imperative demand from facts that shine forth clear as beacons.

Whoever, out of a limited point of view considers as "practicable" only that to which he has accustomed himself, will consider what is here said as "impractical." If he is not able to convert himself, and if he continues to exert an influence upon any domain of life, then he

will not make for the betterment but for the further illness of the social organism, just as people of his manner of thinking have been instrumental in bringing about the present conditions.

The striving with which certain circles of mankind have begun and which has led to the transference of certain branches of economic life (post-office, railroads, etc.) to the life of the state, must give way to the opposite movement: the dissolving of all economic activity out of the domain of the political state. Thinkers, who fancy that their will is directed toward a sound social organism, draw the final conclusions of this striving for state ownership and operation propounded by certain circles of the present day. They demand the socialization of all economic agents in so far as they are means of production. . . . . A sound development will give to economic life its independence and to the political state the ability by its ordering of rights to re-act upon the economic body so that the individual person will not feel his integration in the social organism to be in contradiction with his consciousness of right.

One can gain insight into the fact how the thoughts here set forth are based *in real life,* if one directs his view to the work which man performs for the social organism by his bodily labor. Within the capitalistic form of economics, this labor has been organized into the social organism in such a manner, that it is bought by the employer from the workman as a ware. An exchange is effected between money (as representative of wares) and labor. But such an exchange cannot, as a matter of fact, be made in reality. It only *seems* to occur. In reality the employer receives from the workman wares, which can only come into existence, if the workman offers up his working power in order that they may be born. Out of the corresponding value of these wares the workman receives one portion, the employer the other. The production of wares results from the working together of employer and workman. The product of their common labor first goes over into the gen-

eral circulatory process of economic life. In order to produce the product a relation of rights is necessary between worker and employer. This, however, can through the capitalistic economy, be transformed into such a relation as is determined by the economic preponderance of the employer over the workman. In a healthy social organism it must be plainly evident that labor cannot be paid. The manner how, and the measure in which a person has to work for the maintenance of the social organism, must be regulated according to his ability and the requirements of a human existence. This can only be done, if this regulation is made by the political state in independence of the administration of the economic life.

Through such a regulation wares receive a basis of value which is comparable to the other basis which exists in the conditions given by nature. Just as the value of one ware as opposed to another grows because of the fact that the gaining of the raw materials for it is more difficult than for the other, so must the value of a ware be dependent upon the kind and the amount of labor which may, according to the order of human rights, be expended upon its production.

The economic life will therefore, as is apparent, be subject from two sides to the conditions necessary for it: from the side of the basis supplied by nature which mankind has to accept as it is given to it, and from the side of the basis in human rights, which out of the human consciousness of right (independent of economic life) within the domain of the political state, *must* be *created*.

It is easy to see, that under such a guidance of the social organism, the level of economic well-being will fall and rise according to the amount of work that, out of the consciousness of right, is put forth. Such a dependence of social economic well-being is, in a sound social organism, necessary. This alone can prevent man from being so used up by the economic life that he is no longer able to feel his existence as worthy of a human being. And upon the presence of the feeling of an

existence unworthy of human beings, are based in truth, all the upheavals in the social organism.

A possibility of not curtailing from the side of organized right the social economic level of well-being all too strongly exists, similar to the possibility of improving the basis supplied by nature. It is possible to make a soil of moderate fertility, more fertile, by technical means; it is possible, prompted by the too great sinking of the level of social well being, to change the manner and the amount of work. But this change may not come directly out of the circulatory process of economic life, but must result from the insight which develops —independent of economic life—within the domain of the life of organized right.

In all that is brought forth by the economic life and the consciousiness of right in the organization of the social life, there is operative that which springs from a third source; from the individual abilities of the individual human being. This domain includes all the highest spiritual performances and extends down to that which enters into human work through the better or less perfect physical adaptation of man for performances which serve the social organism. What springs from this source must flow into the sound social organism in quite a different way from that which lives in the exchange of wares and what can flow out of the state life. There is no other possibility of effecting, in a sound way, the acceptance of what flows from this source, than to let it be dependent upon the free receptivity of people and upon the impulses which come out of the individual abilities themselves. If the human performances, which come into existence through such abilities, are artificially influenced by the economic life or by the organization of the state, then the true basis of such living performances is withdrawn, which can only consist in the power that they are able to develop out of themselves. If the acceptance of such performances is directly controlled by the economic life, or organized by the state, the free receptivity for them is paralyzed, which free receptivity alone is

suited to let them flow in a healthy manner into the social organism. The spiritual life, (that is all those activities which are based upon **individual** ability, upon the development, initiative and power of the individual human spirit) with which the depelopment of the other individual abilities in human life hangs together by many many threads not to be comprehended by human view, only then has the possibility for a healthy development, when it is placed upon its own impulses in the matter of creation, and when it stands in an appreciative connection with the people who receive its productions.

What is here pointed out as the necessary conditions for the healthy development of the spiritual life, this is not recognized at present, because the proper view for it is dimmed by the fusion of a large part of this life with the life of the political state, a fusion that has developed in the course of the last centuries and to which one has become accustomed. Of course we talk about the "freedom of science and of teaching." But we consider it a matter of course that the political state administer the "free sciences" and the "free teaching." We develop no feeling for the way the state, thereby, makes the spiritual life dependent upon its requirements as a state. We think: the state creates the positions in which teaching is carried out, and then those who occupy these positions can in perfect "freedom" develop the spiritual life. We ignore, when we accustom ourselves to such an opinion, how closely connected the *content* of the spiritual life is with the innermost nature of the person in whom it unfolds itself. And that this development can only then be a free development when it is placed into the social organism through no other impulses whatsoever than only those which come out of the spiritual life itself. By being fused with the life of the state, not only has the administration of the sciences and of that part of the spiritual life which hangs together with them received its characteristic stamp, but also its very content. Of course, what is produced in

mathematics or physics, cannot be directly influenced by the state. But just consider history and the cultural sciences. Have they not become a reflection of that, which, out of the connection of their bearers with the life of the state, has resulted out of the requirements of this state life? Precisely because of this character with which they have in this manner been stamped, do the present scientifically couched concepts, which dominate the spiritual life, affect the proletariat as ideology. The proletariat noticed how human thoughts become stamped by a certain character according to the requirements of the state life or of the economic life in which the interests of the leading classes are cared for. A mere reflection of material interests and conflicts of interests, is what he who thought in a proletarian manner, saw; this created in him the feeling, all spiritual life is ideology; it is merely the reflection of the economic organization.

Such a view, which makes of the spiritual life of man a desert, ceases, if the feeling can arise: in the spiritual domain there reigns a reality which goes far beyond the external material life, a reality which bears its content within itself. But it is impossible for such a feeling to arise, if the spiritual life does not out of its own impulses freely unfold and administrate itself within the social organism. Only such bearers of the spiritual life who live within such an unfolding and administration have the power to secure for the spiritual life its appropriate influence within the social organism. Art, science, religion, Weltanschauung, and all that hangs together with them, require such an independent position in human society. For in the spiritual life everything hangs together. The freedom of the one cannot thrive without the freedom of the other. Even though mathematics and physics are not as to their content to be directly influenced by the state; what one develops out of them, how people will think concerning their value, what effects their cultivation can have upon the entire remainder of the spiritual life, and many other matters are determined by such requirements, where the state

administrates branches of the spiritual life. It is quite a different matter if the teacher of the elementary grades follows the impulses of the state life; from the other situation where he receives these impulses from out a spiritual life which is placed on its own feet. The Social-Democrats have in this domain also, only taken over the legacy of the habits of thought and convictions of the leading classes. They consider it their ideal to draw the spiritual life into the social body which they will erect upon the basis of economic life. They could by this means, only continue to follow out the path by which the spiritual life has found its depreciation. They have developed a correct feeling with their demand—religion must be a private matter. For in a healthy social organism all spiritual life must be, with regard to state and economic life, in the sense here indicated a "private matter." But the Social-Democrats in their relegation of religion to the private domain do not proceed from the opinion, that thereby they will create for a spiritual good a position within the social organism through which it will attain a more desirable, a higher development than under the influence of the state. They are of the opinion that the social organism may only cultivate with its means, what seems to *it* to be a life-necessity. And religion, this spiritual good, is, in their opinion, not such a life-necessity. In this way, one-sidedly ejected from public life, one branch of the spiritual life cannot thrive, if the other spiritual goods are fettered. The religious life of more modern mankind will, in connection with all emancipated spiritual life, develop soul bearing power for this mankind.

Not only the production, the reception also of this spiritual life by mankind, must rest upon the free requirements of the soul. Teachers, artists, and so forth, who in their position in human social life are only in immediate connection with an organization and administration which develop out of the spiritual life itself, and who are borne only by the impulses of the free spiritual life, will be able through the nature of their

working to develop a receptivity for their productions in people who are subject, through the political state working *out of itself,* not only to the necessity of working, but who are also given by the organized right the leisure which awakens the understanding for spiritual values. Persons, who consider themselves "practicians in life," upon hearing these thoughts may find the belief arising in them: the people will squander their leisure, and we shall lapse into illiteracy if the state provides for such leisure and if the attendance at school is placed within the free understanding of people. If such "pessimists" would only wait and see what will happen when the world is no longer under their influence, which is only too often determined by a certain feeling that silently whispers to them how they spend their leisure, and what force was necessary in order to get a little "education" and "culture" into them. The kindling power, which a spiritual life that really stands on its own feet, has in the social organism, cannot be reckoned with by them, for the fettered spiritual life was never able to kindle any sparks in their souls.

Both the political state and the economic life will receive the influx from the spiritual life of the abilities which they need, from the self-governing spiritual organism. Even practical education for economic life, through the free co-operation of this domain with the spiritual organism, will for the first time be able to unfold its full power. Persons of the appropriate education will, through the power that comes to them from the emancipated spiritual life, cause the experiences, which they will be able to make in the economic domain, to become quick with life. People with experiences gained in the economic life will find it possible to enter the spiritual organization and there to work fructifyingly upon what must be so fructified.

Within the domain of the political state, the healthy views that are necessary will develop, through such a free operation of the spiritual goods. The person who performs manual labor, will no longer be unable to feel

what position his labor holds in the social organism, as invariably is the case where such a free spiritual life does not freely influence the life of the social organism. He will attain the insight, how and why it is, that the social organism cannot support and carry him without the leadership which organizes manual labor in a way suited to the task in hand. He will be able to take up in himself the feeling of the vital connection of *his* work with the organizing powers which have their source in the development of individual human abilities. He will, within the field of the political state, build out those rights which guarantee to him a sharing in the yield of the wares which he produces. And he will finally in full freedom bring forth such a sympathetic participation in the spiritual goods which come to him, as will enable such spiritual goods to be produced. Within the domain of the spiritual life it will then be possible for the producers of this spiritual life to live from the yield of what they produce: whatever anyone does for himself within the domain of the spiritual life, will remain his most intimate privacy; whatever anyone is able to do for the social organism will be able to count upon the free compensation of those to whom that spiritual good is a necessity. Whoever, by such a freely given compensation cannot find within the spiritual organization what he needs, will have to pass into the domain of the political state or of the economic life.

Into the economic life there flow the technical ideas, which have their source in the spiritual life. These ideas have their source in the spiritual life even though they be immediately brought forth by members of the political or economic domain. Out of the spiritual life spring all the ideas and powers for organization which fructify the economic and political life. The compensation for this influx into these two social domains will result either as in the previous case, out of the free comprehension of those who are dependent upon this influx, or this compensation will be regulated by rights which will be developed within the domain of the po-

litical state. What this political state itself needs for its support, can be raised by means of the right of taxation. This right will take shape through a harmonization of the demands of the consciousness of right with those of the economic life.

Side by side with the political and the economic domains there must be operative in a sound and healthy social organism, the self-centered domain of the spirit. Toward this Triorganation of the Social Organism, does the direction of movement of the forces of development of more modern mankind, point. As long as social life allowed itself to be chiefly guided by the instinctive forces of a great part of mankind, the tendency toward this decided organation did not develop. In a certain dimness of social life there worked together what fundamentally always came from three sources. The newer time demands that man consciously assume his position in the organism of society. This consciousness can give the actions and the whole life of man a sound form, only then when it is illumined from three sides. For this illumination modern mankind strives in the unconscious depths of its soul; and what is living itself out as the social movement, is only the unclear reflection of this striving.

Out of other fundamental conditions than those are in which we are today living, there arose out of the hidden depths of human nature at the close of the eighteenth century, the cry for a new-forming of the human social organization. And as the motto for this new organization there were uttered three words: fraternity, equality, freedom. Well now, whoever with a mind free from prejudice and with healthy human feelings, looks into the reality of human evolution, he must necessarily find within himself sympathy and understanding for all what these words indicate. Nevertheless, there were subtile thinkers a-plenty who in the course of the nineteenth century gave themselves much pains to show how impossible it is to make fraternity, equality and freedom real in an unitarian social organism. Such

subtile thinkers fancied they could prove, that these three impulses would, as soon as they began to realize themselves, necessarily contradict one another in the social organism. It has been shown with great subtility how impossible it is, if, for example, the impulse to equality becomes a reality, for freedom, which is a necessary component of every human being, to receive its due also. And it is impossible to avoid agreeing with those who point out this contradiction; but nevertheless, one just as certainly and inevitably out of general human feeling, has sympathy for each one of these three ideals!

This contradiction exists, because of the fact that the true social importance of these three ideals only becomes evident when one comprehends the necessary Triorganation of the Social Organism. These three ideals may not be joined together and centralized in the abstract unity of a parliament or anything else, they must be living realities, one in each of the three social organs, and only through their living working, side by side and together, can the unity of the entire social organism come into existence. In real life, the apparent contradictions work together to form a unity. Therefore, one will be able to comprehend the life of the social organism as soon as one is able to see how the social organism must be built in reality with reference to fraternity, equality, and freedom. Then one will recognize that the co-operation of people in *economic* life must be based upon that fraternity which comes from their economic associations. In the second organ, in the system of *public rights,* which is concerned with the purely human relation of person to person, one has to strive for the making real of the ideal of equality. And in the *spiritual domain,* which has a position of relative independence in the social organism, we are concerned with making real the impulse for freedom. Looked at in this way, the three ideals show their value for reality. They cannot become real in a chaotic social life. They can only become real in a healthy Triorganic Social Organism. Not an abstractly centralized social structure will be able to

realize in a grand mixture the ideals of freedom, equality, fraternity, but each of these three organs of the social organism can draw its strength from one of these ideals. And it will then work together with the other organs in a fruitful manner.

Those people, who at the close of the eighteenth century raised the demand for making real the three ideals of freedom, equality, fraternity, and those also, who later on repeated this demand, they could dimly feel to what goal the forces of development of more modern mankind were moving. But they did not, along with this perception, lose their belief in the unitarian state. For this unitarian state their ideas were contradictions. But these people confessed their belief in these contradictions because in the subconscious depths of their souls' life there was operative the striving toward the Triorganation of the Social Organism in which the trinity of their ideas can livingly produce a higher unity. To make the forces of development, which in the growth of more modern mankind are pressing toward this Triorganation, conscious social volition, this is demanded by the not-to-be-misunderstood *facts* of the present.

CHAPTER III.

Capitalism and Social Ideas.

(Capital, Human Labor.)

ONE cannot arrive at a judgment regarding what mode of action in the social domain is demanded at present by the importunate facts, if one does not have the will to let this judgment be determined by a real insight into the fundamental forces of the social organism. The attempt to gain such an insight lies at the basis of the exposition that has just been given. Measures, which are based upon a judgment gained from a limited field of observation, cannot today produce fruitful results. The facts, which have grown out of the social movement, reveal disorders in the fundamental basis of the social organism and not merely local disturbances. With regard to these fundamental disorders it is necessary to attain insights which also penetrate to the very foundations.

If one speaks of capital and capitalism today, one calls attention to that wherein proletarian mankind seeks the causes of its oppression. But a fruitful judgment, concerning the way in which capital operates helpfully or as a hindrance in the circulatory system of the social organism, can only be gained, when one has complete insight into the way in which the individual abilities of people, into the way in which the organization of right, into the way in which the forces of the economic life produce and consume capital. . . . . When one speaks of human labor, one directs attention to that which, with the natural basis of economics and together with capital, creates the economic values; and this is also that by which the workman attains the conscious-

ness of his social position. A judgment concerning the position this human labor must assume in the social organism, in order not to disturb the feeling of his human worth of the workman, can only be attained, if one is willing to take into view the relation which human labor has on the one hand to the unfolding of individual abilities, and on the other hand to the consciousness of right.

The question is put at present, and rightly so, what is to be done *immediately* in order to do justice to the demands which are arising in the social movement. We shall not be able to carry out in a fruitful manner even the actions *immediately* necessary if we do not know what relation to the fundamental basis of the healthy social organism the required action bears. And if one knows this, then one will be able at the place where one is, or at the place where one is able to take one's stand, to find the tasks which present themselves from out the facts. The acquiring of an insight, such as has been here called attention to, is made very difficult by that which has in the course of a long time out of human volition entered into the social institutions, and which leads astray the unbiased judgment. We have lived ourselves into our social institutions in such a manner that we have from out them formed opinions concerning what of them is to be retained and what is to be altered. We have the habit of adapting our thinking to that which our thinking ought to dominate. But today it is necessary to see, that we can in no other wise gain a judgment that really takes account of facts, than by going back to the *primal ideas* which are at the basis of all social institutions.

If proper sources are not at hand, from which the forces, which lie in these primal ideas, can continually flow afresh into the social organism, then the social institutions assume forms which are not helpful but detrimental to life. In the impulses of mankind, however, these primal ideas live on, more or less consciously. And it is *they,* which, openly or concealed come to light in the

revolutionary upheavals of the social organism. These upheavals will only then not occur, when the social organism has such a form that at every moment the tendency can be present, to observe where a divergence prescribed by the primal ideas is taking shape, and where at the same time the possibility exists of counteracting this divergence, before it has acquired a catastrophal strength.

In our day, the divergences from the conditions as demanded by the primal ideas have become very great in every field of human life. And the life of the impulses in the souls of men, which are borne by these ideas, confronts us as a loud crying criticism made by the facts concerning that which has taken form in the social organism in the last centuries. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary to have the earnest good will to turn energetically to the primal ideas, and not to be mistaken as to how detrimental it is today, of all times, to ban these primal ideas as "impractical" generalities out of the domain of life. In the life and in the demands of the proletarian population there lives the criticism made by the facts concerning that which more recent times have made out of the social organism.

One of the basic questions which arises out of this criticism, is, in what way can the oppression cease which proletarian mankind is subject to from private capitalism? The possessor or administrator of capital is in the position of being able to place the physical labor of other men in the service of that which he undertakes to produce. We have to distinguish three members in the social relation that results, when capital and human labor co-operate; the undertaking activity, which must rest upon the foundation of the individual abilities of a person or of a group of persons; the relation of the undertaker to the workman, which must be a relation of rights; the production of an article which receives value as a ware in the circulatory process of economic life. The undertaking activity can only then operate and enter in a healthy manner into the social organism,

if in the life of the social organism there are forces active which allow the individual abilities of people to reveal themselves in action in the best possible way. This is only possible if there is present in social life a domain which gives to the able the free initiative to make use of his abilities, and which makes possible an estimate of the value of these abilities through a free understanding of them by other men. It is evident: the social activity of a person through the agency of capital belongs in that domain of the social organism whose legislation and administration is performed by the spiritual life. If the political state enters into this operation, there will necessarily come into play a lack of understanding for individual abilities in determining their actvity. For the poltical state must be based upon and must put into operation that which is present in all men as the same demand of life. In the domain of the political state all men must be allowed to make their judgment count. For that which the political state has to do, understanding or lack of understanding for individual abilities plays no part. Therefore, that which is carried out in it, may not exert any influence upon the activity of individual human abilities. Just as little ought the prospects for economic advantage be able to determine the operation with capital of the individual abilities. To this economic advantage great importance is attached by many judges of capitalism. They opine that individual abilities can be brought into activity only by means of the stimulus of this advantage. And they base their opinion as "practical" men upon the imperfection of human nature which they claim to know. It is true, within the order of society which has brought forth the present conditions, the prospect of economic advantage has acquired a very great importance. But precisely this fact is to no small degree the cause of the conditions which can now be experienced. And these conditions importunately strive for the development of other incentives for putting into action individual abilities. This incentive will have to lie in the *social*

understanding which will flow from out a healthy spiritual life. Education, the school, will, out of the power of a free spiritual life, fit out man with impulses which will cause him, by the might of the understanding he will possess, to make real that to which his individual abilities push him.

Such an opinion need not be vain faddism. Of course, faddism has caused as incalculably great disaster in the domain of social volition as in other domains. But the view here presented does not rest, as can be seen from what has been said thus far, upon the delusion that the "spirit" will work wonders if those people who imagine themselves to possess it only talk as much as possible about it. The view here presented results from the observation of the free working together of people in the domain of the spirit. This working together receives because of its own nature, a social character, if it only be in a position to develop itself in a *truly free* manner.

Only the unfree nature of the spiritual life has thus far not allowed this social character to unfold itself. Within the leading classes the spiritual powers have developed in a way which has sequestered the production of these powers in an anti-social way within distinct circles of mankind. What was produced within these circles could only be brought in an artificial manner to proletarian mankind. And proletarian mankind could draw no soul-bearing power from this spiritual life, for it did not *really* have a share in the life of these spiritual goods. Arrangements for "popular instruction", for the "education of the people" to an "appreciation of art" and similar things are not in truth means for socializing the spiritual goods. For the "masses" are not with the innermost participation of their human nature really rooted in the life of these spiritual goods. It is only permitted to them, from as it were a point of view that lies outside the spiritual life, to gaze upon the spiritual life. And what is true of the spiritual life in the more narrow sense of the word, this is of very great importance also for those ramifications of spiritual activities which flow into eco-

nomic life upon the basis of capital. The workman must be able with the full participation of his nature in the matter, to develop concepts about the way in which he takes part in the life of society when he works at the production of wares. Talks, which are considered as much a part of the work to be done as the work itself, must be regularly held by the undertaker for the purpose of developing an area of concepts common to both workman and employer. A healthy activity of this sort will create in the workman an understanding of how the proper activity of the capitalist promotes the welfare of the social organism, and thereby of the workman himself, who is a member thereof. The undertaker will be aided, by such openness of his way of doing business, which aims at creating a free understanding, in keeping all his acts above suspicion (even).

Only he who has no appreciation for the social workings of the inner common experience of a matter pursued in common, will consider what has been said to be without significance. Whoever has such an appreciation will thoroughly comprehend the fact how economic productivity is increased, if in economic life the leadership which rests upon a capital basis is administered in the domain of the free spiritual life. That interest in capital and its multiplication which is only present because of the profit to be gained, can only—if this presupposition is fulfilled—make room for the interest in the matter itself of producing articles and of bringing forth productions.

The socialistic thinking people of the present day are working for the administration of the means of production by society. What is justified in this their striving can be accomplished only by having this administration cared for by the domain of the free spiritual life. By this means the economic compulsion is made impossible, the economic compulsion which is inevitably wielded by the capitalist if his activity unfolds itself out of the forces of economic life. And by this means, furthermore, the paralyzation of individual human abilities will not be able to occur, which would always have to result as a conse-

quence, were these abilities to be administered by the political state.

The yield of the co-operation of capital and individual human abilities, must, in the healthy social organism, just as every spiritual production, result on the one hand from the free initiative of the active person, and on the other hand from the free understanding of other people who desire the existence of the productions made by the producer. Within the free initiative of the performer must in this domain be placed the measuring of that which he—according to the preparation which he needs in order to carry them out, according to the expenses he has to incur in order to make them possible—wishes to consider the yield of his performance. His demands will be able to be satisfied only when an understanding for his performance is shown.

By means of social arrangements carried out in the direction here indicated, the foundation is laid for a really free contractual relationship between the director and the performer of labor. And this relationship will not be concerned with the exchange of wares (i. e., money) for labor power, but with the fixing of the share which each of the two persons has, who produce wares by co-operative activity.

Whatever is performed upon a capital basis for the social organism *is in its essential nature dependent* upon the manner in which individual human abilities are coupled up with, or play into, the social organism. The development of these abilities can receive the necessary and appropriate impulse through nothing else than through the free spiritual life. This is so true, that in a social organism which harnesses this development within the shafts of the administration of the political state or within the forces of economic life, the real productivity of all that which requires the operation of capital, will rest upon those of the individual powers which force their way through the meshes of these paralyzing institutions. With this difference, however, that a development under these conditions last described will be an un-

healthy development. Not the free unfolding of individual abilities which operate upon a capital basis has created conditions within which human working power must be a ware, but the fettering of these forces by the political state or by the circulatory process of economic life. To recognize this without all bias is in the present day, presupposition for everything that must be done in the domain of social organization. For more modern time has brought forth the superstition that the measures which make the social organism healthy ought to proceed from the political state or from economic life. If we continue along the course which has received its direction from this superstition, then we shall create arrangements which will not lead mankind to that for which it strives, but to an augmentation without end of the oppression which it is longing to cast from itself.

Concerning capitalism we have learned to think at a time in which this capitalism has caused a severe sickness of the social organism. The condition of sickness we experience. We see clearly that action must be taken against it. We shall have to see *more*. We shall have to realize that the sickness has its origin in the absorption of the forces operative in capital by the circulatory powers of economic life. He alone is able to work in the direction energetically demanded by the evolutionary forces of mankind at the present moment, who does not let himself be driven into illusion, by the manner of thinking which considers the administration of operations with capital by the emancipated spiritual life to be the product of "unpractical idealism".

At present, it is true, we are not at all prepared to bring the social idea, which shall draw the balance of capitalism, into immediate connection with the spiritual life. We hitch our reformatory notions to that which belongs to the circulatory process of economic life. We see how, in more recent times, the production of wares has led to the industrial factory, and this to the present form of capitalism. And it is now proposed to substitute for this economy, a co-operative economy which

works for the actual demands of the producers themselves. But since one very naturally wants to maintain the economy of the modern means of production, the demand is made that all industries and factories be united into one grand co-operative concern. In such a concern, people fancy, each individual will produce for the order of the commonality, which would not be able to exploit the individual since it would thereby exploit itself. And since it is expedient or necessary to proceed from what already exists, the proposition is made to take the modern state and transform it into an all-inclusive co-operative society.

One does not notice that one promises one's self results from such a co-operative society, which will all the less be able to appear, the larger the co-operative society is, if the operation of the individual human abilities within the organism of this co-operative society is not so ordered as has been portrayed in this work.

That an unprejudiced mind can discern but very little basis for the taking part of the spiritual life in the social organism, results from the fact that we have accustomed ourselves to conceive the spiritual as being very far removed from all things material and practical. There will be not a few who will find an element of the grotesque in the view here set forth, that in the operation of capital in economic life the resultant effects of one part of the spiritual life must manifest themselves It is probable that in this characterization of the matter as set forth as something grotesque, members of the up-till-now leading classes of mankind will agree with socialistic thinkers. In order to realize the full importance precisely of this, which will be considered grotesque by many, for the recuperation of the social organism, we shall have to direct our attention to certain currents of thought of the present day which in their way arise out of honest impulses, but which obstruct the birth of a real social thinking wherever they find entrance.

These currents of though flow—more or less unconsciously—away from that which gives to inner experi-

ence its real punch. They strive to gain a conception of life, either an inner life of the soul, or an inner life of thought, or an inner life of striving for scientific knowledge, as an island, as it were, within the great flood of human life as a whole. They are then not in a position to build a bridge from this insular life of the soul to that which harnesses men to the work-a-day world. One can notice how many people of the present day consider it "cultured" and "refined" to ponder in a certain—even scholastic—abstractness in elysian fields upon all manner of ethical and religious problems. One can notice how people ponder how and in what manner man can acquire virtue, how he ought to conduct himself in love toward his fellow men, how he can receive the divine grace of an "inner content of life". But one also sees then, the inability to effect a transition from that which these people call good and loving and well-meaning and right and moral to that which surrounds men in external reality in the work-a-day world, as the operation of capital, as labor wage, as consumption, as production, as circulation of wares, as the system of credit, as banking and the exchange of stocks and bonds. One can see how two world currents are placed side by side even in the habit of thought of people: the *one* world current which wants to maintain itself in, as it were, divinely spiritual heights, which does not want to build a bridge between that which is a spiritual impulse and that which is a fact of everyday action in life. The *other* world current lives without thought in the matters of fact. Life, however, is a unity It can only thrive when the forces that impel it work down from all ethical and religious life, down into the profanest most everyday life, into that life which seems to many to be less refined. For if one neglects to build the bridge between these two domains of life, one relapses with respect to religious and moral life and in respect of social thinking, into mere faddism which is far removed from plain, everyday true reality. Then man strives—out of a certain "spiritual" impulse—for all manner of ideal goals, for all manner of things which he calls

"good"; but those instincts, which are opposed to these "ideals" as the basis of the ordinary daily demands of life, whose satisfaction must come out of social economy, to these instincts man gives himself without "spirit". He is ignorant of a path in accordance with reality from the concept of spirituality to that which occurs in everyday life. Hereby this everyday life assumes a form which can have nothing to do with that which as ethical impulses must be maintained in more refined spiritual and soulful heights. But the vengeance of everyday life, then, is that the ethical and religious life, because it holds itself aloof from everyday, from immediate life-practice, without being noticed by men, forms itself to an inner lie-of-life of men.

How very numerous are the people today who, out of a certain ethical and religious refinement, show the very best *will* for a proper living together with their fellow men, who would like to do only the very best for their fellow men, but who neglect to achieve a manner of feeling which really enables them to carry out their purpose, because they have been unable to acquire a social conception, a conception that is operative in the *practical* habits of life.

From the circles of such persons are those people sprung who—in this moment of crucial importance for the development of the world, in which the social questions have become so pressing—as hair-brained idealists that fancy themselves to be practitioners of life, hem and work against true practice of life. From these people one can hear words such as the following: It is necessary that mankind rise above the dominant materialism, that mankind turn its back upon the external and material living which has driven us into the catastrophe of the World War and into misfortune, and turn toward a spiritual conception of life. Such people, in showing the paths which lead men to spirituality, never get tired of citing those personalities whom one has honored in the past because of their spiritually directed manner of thinking. And if anyone tries to point out what the spirit must

as imperatively do for real, practical life today as bread must be made, he will get the reply, that it is necessary first of all to bring mankind again to a recognition of the spirit. But what is really necessary today is, that from out the power of the spiritual life the directive lines be found for the healing of the social organism. To accomplish this, it will not suffice that men occupy themselves with the spirit in a side current of life. In order to accomplish this it is necessary that everyday existence be made spiritual. The tendency for the "spiritual life" to seek such side channels has led the classes who have thus far been the leading classes to find delight in conditions which have resulted in the present facts.

Very closely connected in the social life of the present are the administration of capital in the production of wares and the possession of the means of production, that is, of capital also. And still these two relationships of men are totally different with reference to their workings within the social organism. The administration of capital by individual abilities, if efficiently carried out, brings into the social organism goods in whose existence all people who belong to this organism have an interest. In whatever station of life a person may be, it is in his interest that nothing be lost of those individual abilities which flow out of the well-springs of human nature, of those individual abilities through which goods are produced which serve human life in a manner suited to their purpose. The development of these abilities can, however, only occur hereby, that the human bearers of such abilities be able to put them into operation out of their own free initiative. Whatever of that which flows from these sources cannot flow forth in freedom, that is withdrawn at least to a certain degree from human welfare. Capital, however, is the means for bringing such abilities in effective operation for broad domains of the social life. To administrate the total possession of capital so that the individual person who has special abilities in some particular direction or that groups of persons who have a special talent, do not come into a disposition of capital, a

disposition which springs purely from their own immediate initiative, in such a state of affairs no one within a social organism can have a real interest. From the man performing predominantly spiritual work to the man performing predominantly manual work, every man must say, if he wants to serve without prejudice his own interests: I should like to have a sufficiently large number of persons of ability or groups of person with ability able not only freely to dispose of capital, but able also to come into control of capital out of their own initiative; for they alone can have a proper judgment as to how through the agency of capial their individual abilities will in a manner suited to the purpose create goods for the social organism.

It is not necessary to show, within the confines of this work, how, in the course of development of humanity, hanging together with the activity of human individual abilities in the social organism, private ownership has resulted from other forms of ownership. Up to the present, under the influence of the division of labor within the social organism such ownership has developed. Concerning the present conditions and their necessary further development shall here be spoken.

However private ownership has taken form, through actions of might and conquest, and so on, it is a result of a social activity that is bound up with individual human abilities. Nevertheless, socialistic thinking people at present are of the opnion that the oppressive element of private ownership will only be able to be eliminated by transforming private ownership into public ownership, and in this regard the question is put in the following manner: How can the private ownership of the means of production be prevented from coming into existence, in order that the oppression of the population without possessions, which is wrought by this private ownership, may cease? Whoever puts the question in this way does not take into careful consideration that the social organism is continually *coming into being,* is continually *growing.* With reference to this growing organism one cannot

ask such a question as: How can we best arrange this organism so that this organism can then remain in the condition which we have recognized to be the best? In this manner one can think concerning a matter which from a certain point of departure continues to operate in a practically unchanged way. This does not hold for the social organism. The social organism continually changes by its life, that which arises within it. If one tries to give it a supposedly best form in which it is then to remain, one thereby undermines its conditions of life.

A condition of life of the social organism is, that he who can serve the body social through his individual abilities be not robbed of the possibility of such service out of his own free initiative. Where for such service, the disposition over means of production is necessary, the prevention of this free disposition would injure the general social interest. What generally is brought forth in regard to this matter, that the undertaker needs as a stimulus to his activity the prospect of profit that is tied up with the ownership of the means of production, that shall not be asserted here. For the manner of thought out of which this portrayal of a development of social relationships flows, must recognize the possibility, through the freeing of the spiritual life from the control of the political and economic commonwealths, that such a stimulus can wither up and fall away. The emancipated spiritual life will inevitably develop social understanding out of itself, and from out this social understanding stimuli will result of quite a different nature from that which lies in the hope of economic advantage. But the point to be considered is not only, out of what sort of impulses men love the private possession of the means of production, but the real point to be considered is: whether the free disposition over the means of production or the disposition regulated by the community really corresponds to the life conditions of the social organism. And in this we must always keep in view that we may not take into consideration for the present social organization those conditions of life which we fancy we can observe amid primitive human societies,

but we must keep in view that we may take into consideration only those conditions of life which correspond to the present stage of development of humanity.

In the present stage of development, the fruitful operation of the individual abilities through the agency of capital *can* only enter into the circulatory process of the economic life by means of the free disposition over capital. In order to produce fruitfully, this disposition must be possible, not *because* it brings advantage to an individual or to a group, but because it can best serve the community if it be borne, in a manner suited to the purpose, by social understanding.

Man is in a certain sense, just as with the deftness of his own limbs, so intimately connected with that which he produces, either by himself or in co-operation with others, that the ligature of the free disposition over the means of production has an effect similar to the paralysis of the free use of the deftness of his limbs.

Now then, private ownership is nothing else than the mediator of this free disposition over capital. For the social organism the matter of ownership has no other consideration than that the owner has the *right* to dispose over his property out of his own free initiative. It is apparent, in the social life two things are intimately connected which are of totally different importance for the social organism: The *free disposition* over the capital-basis of social production, and the *relation of rights* to other men into which the disposer enters by the fact that by his right of disposition these other men are excluded from freely operating with this capital-basis.

It is not the *original* free disposition that leads to social injuries, but merely the *continuance* of this right to such free disposition after the conditions have ceased to exist which bind together, in a manner suited to the purpose, the individual human abilities with this disposition. Whoever considers the social organism as a developing, growing organism, will not be able to misconstrue what has here been said. He will seek to find out the possibility, how that which serves life in its one aspect can be so

administered that it does not cause injury to life through its other aspect. What *lives* can in no other possible wise be fruitfully conditioned than that in the process of living that which comes into existence shall also have its drawbacks. And if we are ourselves to take part in the life of a growing organism, as man must with regard to the social organism, then our task cannot be, to prevent the coming into existence of a necessary arrangement in order to avoid the injuries it will in time cause, for hereby we undermine the possibility of life of the organism. Our task can only be, to provide that appropriate action be taken at the point where and at the proper moment when the arrangement that was originally suited to its purpose transforms itself into an injurious institution.

The possibility of freely disposing over the capital-basis of production out of individual ability, must exist; the right of ownership connected herewith must be able to be changed on the instant in which it transforms itself into a means for the unjustified development of power. In our time we have an arrangement which takes into account the social demands here set forth, which is partly carried out only with regard to the so-called spiritual property. This is transferred, a few years after the death of the creator, into the free ownership of the commonality. This arrangement is based upon a way of thinking suited to the nature of human life in a society. Although the production of a purely spiritual good is inseparably bound up with the individual ability of the individual, it is at the same time the result of human living in a society and must, at the proper moment, be transferred to this social life. No difference whatsoever obtains with regard to other property. That the individual by its aid produces in the service of society as a whole, is only possible because of the co-operation of this society as a whole. The right to dispose over a property can not—it will be seen—be administered apart from the interests of this society as a whole. The task is not to find a means whereby the possession of the capital-basis of production can be annihilated, but the task is, to find a means whereby this

possession can be so administrated that it serve society as a whole in the best possible manner.

In the Triorganic Social Organism this means can be found. The people united in the social organism operate as a whole through the state, which takes care of human rights. The operation of the individual abilities belongs to the spiritual organization.

Every single thing connected with the social organism makes plain to a view that has an understanding for *realities* and that does not allow itself to be dominated by subjective opinions, theories and desires, the necessity for the Triorganation of this Organism. But this necessity becomes especially clear and plain in considering the question of the relation of the individual human abilities to the capital-basis of economic life and to the possession of this capital-basis. The state, which is concerned with human rights, will not be called upon to prevent the origin and administration of the private possession of capital so long as the individual abilities remain so bound up with the capital-basis that the administration thereof performs a service for the social organism as a whole. The state will always continue to be concerned with the *right* of private property. The state will never take private property into its own possession. It will merely at the proper instant cause the private property of one individual or group of individuals to be transferred to the free disposition of another individual or group of individuals who are able to establish again the relation to the property which is determined by individual ability. The social organism will hereby be served from two totally different points of view. Out of the democratic depths of the state, which is concerned with all those things that affect *all people* in the same way, it will be possible to take care that the right of possession does not become in the course of time the wrong of possession. Because of the fact that the state does not itself administrate the property but merely causes its transference to individual human abilities, these individual human abilities will be able to

develop their principal power for the social organism as a whole. So long as it appears suited to the purpose, such an organization will permit the rights over property or the disposition over these rights to remain vested in the individual. One can conceive that the representatives of the state, which is concerned with human rights, will make quite different laws at different times concerning the transference of property from one individual or group of individuals to others. . . . . At present, where such a great mistrust to all private property has developed in a great many circles, a radical transference of private property into communal ownership is projected. If we were to advance very far along this road, we should see that thereby the possibilities of life of the social organism are ligatured. And taught by experience, we should then try a different road. But it would doubtless be better if in the present and at once we put our hands to such arrangements as have been here described, which would restore to the social organism its health. . . . . So long as a person by himself alone or in connection with a group of persons continues the productive activity which has brought such a person into connection with a capital-basis, the right of disposal over the sum total of capital which results from the original capital as profit of operation must remain with such a person, when the capital arising as profit of operation is used for the enlargement of the operating concern. From the time when such a person ceases to administrate the production, the sum total of capital therein employed must be transferred to another person or to another group of persons for the continued operation of the production in question, or for the operation of a similar production or for the operation of some other production of value to the social organism. Likewise, such capital as is created by the productive process and is not used for the enlargement of the production, must from the time of its coming into existence, go the same way. As personal property of him who directs the production is to be considered only what he receives on the basis of those demands which he was able

to make because of his individual ability when the production was taken up, and which seem justified because of the fact that other men had enough faith in him to supply him with capital upon the basis of these demands. Has the capital, through the activity of this person, increased, then this person may consider as his private property so much of this increase so that the increment to his original receipts will correspond to the increment the capital has received because of his activity, in the sense of a rate of interest. When the first administrator no longer can or cares to administrate the concern, the capital with which a productive concern was inaugurated will according to the will of the original possessors, together with all incumbent obligations, either pass over to the new administrator or revert to the original possessors.

In these arrangements we are concerned with a transference of rights. The making of the legal conditions under which such transferences shall take place, is the task of the state, which is concerned, it must always be borne in mind, only with human rights. The state will have to watch over and secure the execution of its laws and carry on their administration. One can conceive that in the particular cases the conditions which regulate such transferences will be found to be right in one way or possibly in another way out of the consciousness of right. A manner of conception which, as the one here portrayed, wants to be *in accordance with reality,* will never purpose more than to point out the *direction* in which the regulation will be able to move. If one enters into this direction with an understanding mind, one will always find, in the concrete particular case, a means suited to the purpose. The correct thing, however, for the practice of life will have to be found, out of the particular relations and out of the spirit of the matter. The more in accordance with reality a manner of thinking is, the less will it desire to lay down the law for individual instances out of preconceived demands. Only, on the other hand, precisely out of the spirit of the manner of thinking, the one thing or the other will follow as a necessary consequence,

in a very decisive manner. Such a necessary consequence is, that the state, which cares for human rights, *may never* through its administration of the transference of rights, bring within its own control the disposition over capital. It will only have to make provision that there is actually carried out such a transference to a person or a group of persons as will let the transference appear justified because of the individual abilities of the new recipients of the transferred rights. From this axiom, then, there follows in the next place the general rule, that whoever, because of the reasons mentioned, proceeds to the transference of capital, has the privilege of deciding as to his successor. He will be able to choose a person or a group of persons, or to transfer the right of disposal to a corporation of the spiritual organization. For whoever, through his administration of capital has performed appropriate and efficient services for the social organism, will also out of his individual ability judge with social understanding concerning the further application of this capital. And it will be more advantageous for the social organism if this judgment is followed than if this judgment were ignored.

An ordering of this sort will come into consideration in the case of masses of capital from a certain height upward, which are acquired by a person or a group of persons through the agency of the means of production (to which land and real estate of course belong) and which do not become personal property on the basis of the original demands made for the putting into operation of the individual abilities.

All acquisitions made in this last described way and all savings which spring from the performances of one's own work, remain until the death of the acquirer or until a later date, in the personal possession of the acquirer or his issue. Until this date interest will have to be paid, as the consciousness of right demands and at a rate to be determined by the state (which is concerned with human rights), by him to whom such savings are given, for the creation of means of production. In a social order that

rests upon the foundations here portrayed, it is possible to carry through a complete separation between the yields which come into existence on the basis of the performance of work with the means of production, and the masses of capital which come into existence on the basis of personal (both physical and spiritual) labor. This separation corresponds to the consciousness of right and to the interests of society as a whole. What somebody saves and then as a saving places at the disposal of a productive industry, this serves the general interests. For only because of such saving is it possible that the productive process can be directed by individual abilities. Whatever increase in the capital—after the proper interest has been deducted—results, this owes its existence to the operation of the social organism as a whole and must therefore in the manner described flow back into this social organism as a whole. The state, which is concerned with human rights, will only have to make provision *that* the transference of the masses of capital in question is carried out in the manner described; but it will not be the business of the state to decide for what material or spiritual production a saving of capital is to be used. This would lead to a tyranny of the state over the spiritual and material production. Such production, however, is in reality best conducted by individual human abilities. It will of course be quite possible for him who does not care to choose the person to whom shall be transferred the capital which he has saved, to vest the right of disposition in a corporation of the spiritual organization.

As in the case of other capital masses, the capital acquired by saving passes, together with the yield of the interest, upon the death of the saver or a certain time thereafter, into the hands of a person or a group of persons who are materially or spiritually productive—but only into the hands of productive persons, not to an unproductive person in whose hands it would yield merely a rented income—and who are to be named by the saver in his last will and testament. And also in case a person or a group of persons cannot immediately be chosen, the

right of disposition would be transferred to a corporation of the spiritual organization. Only in case there is no will, that is, in case a person does not make any disposition, then the state, which is concerned with human rights, will step in for him and see to it that such disposition is made through the spiritual organization.

Within a social order so ordered the free initiative of the individual person and the interests of society as a whole, both receive their due, parallel and concomitantly. The interests of society as a whole are served in the very best possible manner in a social order so ordered, thereby, that the free individual initiative is put in the service of society as a whole. Whoever has to entrust his labor to the direction of another person will know, in a social order so ordered, that that which his work in co-operation with the director creates, will become fruitful in the best possible way for the social organism and consequently for the workman himself also. The social order here described will create a healthy relation, one that is in harmony with the sound feeling of man, between the rights of disposition over the means of production as embodied in capital, which rights are regulated by the human consciousness of right, between these rights of disposition and labor on the one hand, and the prices of the productions created by these two factors on the other hand. . . . . Perhaps many a person notices imperfections in what has been here set forth. They may be discovered. A manner of thought that is in tune with reality does not make the attempt to lay down complete and perfect "programs" once and for all times. A manner of thinking in tune with reality is able to show the direction in which practical work is to be done. And such specific directions as have here been given have been cited merely in order to elucidate, as by an example, the direction that has been pointed out. Such an example may be improved; if only this be done in the indicated direction, then it will be possible to attain a fruitful goal.

Justified personal or family impulses will in such a social order be able to be brought into harmony with the

demands of human society as a whole. It is of course possible to point out that the temptation for a person to transfer his property while yet living to one or more of his issue is very great. And that one can make of such offspring apparently productive persons, who are in realty, however, inefficient in comparison with others, and who would be far better replaced by such others. But this temptation will be, in an organization ordered along the lines indicated above, reduced to a minimum. For the state, which is concerned with human rights, need only prescribe that under all circumstances the property which has been transferred to one member of a family by another, upon elapse of a certain time after the death of him who made the transfer, pass into the control of a corporation of the spiritual organism, or that the same end be achieved in some other way.

The state, which is concerned with human rights, will only take care *that* this change of control is effected; the selection of the successor in the control of the property must be determined by arrangements which arise out of the spiritual organization. By carrying out such presuppositions, an understanding will be developed that offspring are by education and instruction to be made suited for the social organism, and that the transference of capital to unproductive persons causes the greatest social harm. A person in whom real social understanding lives, has no interest in having his connection with the capital basis of production pass on to persons or groups of persons whose individual abilities do not justify such a choice.

Nobody will consider what has here been said to be an utopia who has an understanding for measures which can be carried out in real practice. For precisely such arrangements have been pointed out which can grow out of the present conditions quite immediately, at every point of life. We shall only have to take the step of deciding that the state, which is concerned with human rights, must gradually relinquish the administration of the economic and the spiritual life, and of not opposing, if there actually should occur that which ought to occur, namely,

that prvate educational institutions arise and that the economic life take its stand on its own foundations. The state schools and state economic institutions need not be abolished from one day to the next; but from small beginnings we shall see the possibility develop of a gradual giving up of the system of state educational and economic activity. Above all things, it is of course necessary that those personalities who are able to be deeply convinced of the sanity of what has here been said or of similar social ideas secure the spread of such ideas. If such ideas find understanding, then by this fact, *faith* will be created in the possibility of a really sound and healthy conversion of the present conditions into such which do not have the noxious arrangements of the present. This faith and confidence, however, is the only thing which will let us hope for a healthy development. For in order to gain such confidence a person must be able to see how new arrangements can be practically linked up with what already exists. And this appears to be precisely the essential point of the ideas that have here been developed, that they do not propose to bring about a better future by continuing the destruction of existing values, which has already become a calamity; but that the making real of such ideas as have here been presented, builds upon what is at hand, and in building gradually brings about the levelling of the unhealthy institutions. A campaign of publicity which does not strive to create confidence in this direction will not achieve what must under all conditions be achieved, viz., a development onward by which the values and the goods that have been created by men thus far and the abilities that have thus far been achieved are not thrown to the winds but are preserved. Even the man of extreme radical thinking can gain confidence in a new ordering of society which preserves the achieved values, if he is confronted by ideas which are able to usher in a really healthy development. Even he will have to recognize that whatever class of men may come into power, the present evils will not be eliminated if the impulses of the class in power are not borne by ideas which make the so-

cial organism healthy and able to live. To despair because one does not believe that a sufficiently large number of persons, not even in the tangles of the present, will be able to develop an understanding for such ideas if the necessary energy can be put in their propagation, would be the same as despairing of the receptivity of human nature for impulses that are sound and adapated to the purpose. *This* question, whether one ought to despair of this matter, ought not even be put, but *only this* other question: What must one do in order to give these ideas, which will create conldence and faith, as much and as good publicity as possible?

An effective spread of the ideas here presented will be balked at first by the fact that the habits of thought of the present age, from two fundamental sources, will not find these ideas acceptable. Either the objection will be made in some form or other that one cannot conceive of the possibility of tearing apart the unity of social life, inasmuch as the three branches of life which have here been portrayed in reality are everywhere inter-twined; or it will be found that even within the unitarian state the independent importance necessary for each of the three organs can be attained and that what has here been said is really a cobweb of thought that has no connection with reality. The first objection proceeds from an unreal thinking, the belief, namely, that people in a community can only create unity of life if this unity is first legislated into the community. But the very opposite is demanded by the reality of life. The unity must come about as the *result;* the various activities which flow together from various directions must create a unity as a final result. *This* idea, which is consonant with reality, was opposed by the development of recent times. Therefore, what lived in man resisted and bucked against this "order" that was brought into life from without, and brought about the present social situation. The second prejudice proceeds from the inability to grasp the radical difference in the operation of the three organs of social life. One does not see that man has a *special* relationship

to each of the three organs, and this special relation can be developed in its peculiar individuality only if there is present in real life a separate ground upon which this relationship, apart from the other two, can take form in order to co-operate with the other two. A view of former times, the physiocratic view, maintained: Either men pass legislation with regard to economic life which opposes the free self-development of this life—in this case such legislation is injurious—or the laws tend in the same direction in which the economic life of its own accord moves—in this case such legislation is superfluous. As an opinion held by scholars this view has been discarded; as a habit of thought it still haunts and plays havoc in human minds. We are in the habit of thinking, if a field of life follows its own laws, then *everything* that is necessary for life must develop out of this field. For example, if economic life is ordered in such a way that people experience the ordering as satisfactory to themselves, then the life of right and of the spirit must also properly develop out of the well-ordered economic field. But this is not possible. And only a thinking which is foreign to reality can believe that this is possible. In the cycle of economic life there is *nothing* which has of itself the tendency to regulate that which flows out of the consciousness of right concerning the relation of man to man. And if one tries to order *this* relation out of economic impulses, we shall harness man together with his labor and with the disposition over the means of labor within economic life. Man becomes a cog in the economic machine. This economic life has the tendency to move continually in one direction, against which action must be taken from another side. Not *when* the legislation concerning human rights proceeds in the same direction prescribed by economic life, is the legislation good, nor, when it opposes the direction of movement of economic life, is the legislation bad; but, when the direction in which economic life moves is constantly influenced by the rights which concern men purely as men, will man be able to lead an existence within economic life worthy of a human

being. And only then, when completely separate from economic life, the individual abilities unfold themselves upon their own ground and constantly bring the new powers into economic activity which *cannot* be created by economic activity of itself, will economic activity develop in a way suited to the best interests of mankind.

It is very remarkable: in the domain of purely external life the advantage of a division of labor is easily seen. We do not believe a tailor ought to be a cattle breeder or keep a cow in order to have fresh milk. With regard to the comprehensive and all-inclusive organization of human life, we believe an unitary order must be the only possible one.

That objections will come from all sides precisely in case the direction of social ideas corresponds to real life, is self-evident. For real life creates contradictions, and whoever thinks in consonance with real life must desire to effect arrangements whose life-contradictions are balanced by other arrangements. He *may not* believe: that an arrangement which presents itself to his thinking as "ideally perfect" will, when it is realized, take shape without contradiction. It is a thoroughly justified demand of present socialism that the modern arrangements in which products are made in order that an individual may profit shall be replaced by others in which products are made in order that all may have articles for consumption. However, precisely he who *completely* acknowledges these demands, will not come to the conclusion of modern socialism: accordingly the means of production must pass over from private ownership into public or communal ownership. He will instead have to draw the entirely different conclusion; acordingly, that which is privately produced on the basis of individual efficiency must, through the proper channels, pass into the possession of the general public. The economic impulse of more recent times pursued the course which creates incomes through the mass of the goods produced; the future will have to strive to discover, out of associations of the necessary consumers, the best methods of production and the

ways from the producer to the consumer. The arrangements which take care of human rights will provide that an industry only remain connected so long with a person or group of persons as this connection is justified by the individual abilities of these persons. Instead of the *communal ownership* of the means of production, there will take place a *circulation* of these means, which will always bring them anew to those persons whose individual abilities will be able to make them serviceable to the community in the best possible way. In this way there will be established for a space, that relation between personality and means of production which has been brought about thus far by private ownership. For the leader of an undertaking and his associates will owe it to the means of production that their abilities bring to them an income in accordance with their demands. They will not fail to lift the production to the highest possible pitch, for the increase of production, it is true, will not yield to them the entire profit, which, according to the spirit of what has been said above, will flow to the community to the degree which results after the deduction of the interest, which flows to the producer because of the increase in production. And it is, of course, quite in the spirit of what here has been said, that the income of the producer must, if the production decrease, decrease in the same ratio as it increased by the increase of production. The income from the spiritual performance of the producer will of course always flow, not so the income from profit, which depends upon relations which are based not in the spiritual work of an undertaker, but in the parallelogram of forces made by the life of the whole community.

One can very well see, through the realization of such social ideas as have here been presented, institutions which exist at present will receive an entirely new importance. Property ceases to be that which it has been up till now. And it will not be led back to a form which has been left behind, but on the contrary it will be developed forward to something entirely new. The articles of possession will be brought into the flow of social life.

The individual will not be able to administrate them out of his private interest to the injury of the community; but neither will the community be able to administrate them bureaucratically to the injury of the individual, but the individual who is adapted thereto will find the way to them in order to serve the community through them.

A feeling, a sense for the interests of the community, can develop through the realization of such impulses, which places production upon a sound basis and preserves the social organism from the dangers of crises. Furthermore, an administration which is solely concerned with the cycle of economic life, will be able to bring about adjustments which may perhaps be made necessary by this economic cycle. For example, suppose an industry should not be in a position to pay to the advancers of capital the interests on their savings, it will be possible, if this production is felt to meet a real demand, for the deficit to be made up by the other branches of industry upon the basis of a free agreement of all persons concerned in these other branches. An economic cycle that is enclosed within itself, which receives from without both the basis of human rights as well as the continual influx of those individual human abilities which come to light, will be concerned only with the creating of the best possible sort of an economy. Thereby such a self-contained economic cycle will be able to bring about such a distribution of goods which gives to each what, according to the level of well being of the community, he may in justice have. If one person shall have apparently more income than another, this will be only because this "more" benefits the whole community, thanks to the individual abilities of the one person.

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A social organism which takes shape in the light of the nature of thinking here portrayed, will be able to regulate, by agreement between the leaders of the life dealing with human rights and the leaders of the economic life, the tithes which are necessary for the support of the life of right. And everything that is necessary for the sup-

port of the spiritual organization will flow to it through the compensation which results out of a free understanding for the spiritual productions by individual persons who are members of the social organism. This spiritual organization will have its sound basis in the individual intiative which finds its expression in a free competition of the individual persons who are able to perform spiritual work.

But *only* in the social organism here intended will the administration of human rights find the necessary understanding for a just distribution of goods. An economic organism which does not make demands upon human labor according to the requirements of the individual branches of production, but which has to order its economy with that which is placed at its disposal by the order of human rights, such an economic organism will fix the value of goods according to the performances which people are able to make for it; it will not allow the performances of human being to be determined by the value of the goods fixed quite independently of human welfare and human dignity. Such an organism will see rights which result from purley human relationships. Children will have the right to an education; the father of a family will as a workman have a higher income than the man without a family. This "more"' will flow to him through arrangements which will be made through agreement of all three social organizations. Such arrangements can take into account the right of education through the following simple means: The economic organization measures the possible height of the educational income, and the state, which is concerned with human rights, determines the rights of the individual according to the opinion of the spiritual organization. Again, it must be borne in mind, that it is the nature of a thinking which takes into consideration reality, to present such particulars only by way of example, to show *the direction* in which it is possible to carry out the arrangements. It may be possible that in particular instances quite other arrangements would be found to be the proper

ones. But this "propriety" will only be able to be found through the working together of the three self-contained and independent organs of the social organism toward the goal proper to each. Here, in this portrayal, there is the desire, in antithesis to much that is considered practical but which really is not, to have the *manner* of thinking, upon which this presentation is based, find out the really practical, namely, such an organization of the social organism which will cause the people within this organization to bring about that which is socially adapted to its purpose.

Just as children have the right to education, so do the aged, invalids, widows, the sick, have the right to support. And the capital-basis for this support must flow into the circulation of the social organism in a way similar to that for the capital-contribution for the education of those who are not yet able to produce. The crux and essential point in this whole matter is, that the determination of what a non-producer receives may not result from considerations of economic life, but on the contrary, that economic life is made dependent upon the considerations which, in this regard, result from the consciousness of right. The persons working in an economic organism will have less as the yield of their performances, the more there will have to be diverted for those who do not earn. But this "less" will be borne by all participants of the social organism in a uniform way, if the impulses here intended are made real. Through the state, which is concerned with human rights, and which is separate from the economic life, that which is a matter of common concern for all men, namely, the education and support of those not able to work, will really be made such a matter of common concern, for within the domain of the organization of right, that is operative wherein *all people have* a say.

A social organism which corresponds to the manner of thinking here characterized will cause the surplus performance, which a man makes because of his individual ability, to be transferred to the commonality, just

as the justified support for the lack of full performance of the less able will be taken from the commonality. "Surplus value" will not be created for the unjustified indulgence of the individual, but for the heightening of that which is able to bring to the social organism values of soul or material goods, and for the cultivation of that which is produced within the social organism out of its lap, without being able to serve it immediately.

Whoever is inclined to the opinion that the keeping separate of the three organs only has an ideal value, and that this separation will result "of itself" in an unitarian organism of state, or in an economic co-operative society comprising the whole state and based upon communal ownership of the means of production, let him direct his gaze to the peculiar kinds of arrangements that will result if this Triorganation is made real. In this case the administration of the state, for example, will not have to recognize money as a legal tender, but this recognition will be based upon those measures which proceed from the administrative bodies of the economic organization. For money, in a sound social organism, can be nothing else than a draft upon wares produced by other people. And one is able to draw wares from the sum stotal of economic life, because one has one's self given wares, which one has produced, to this domain. By means of money-exchange an economic domain is made an uniform economy. Everyone produces in the roundabout way through the whole economic life for everyone. Within the economic domain we are concerned only with wares and the value of wares. For this domain even the *performances* which arise from the organization of the state and spiritual life assume the character of wares. What a teacher performs for his pupils is, for the economic cycle, a ware. The teacher will have his individual abilities paid just as little as the workman will have his working power paid. There can be paid, it is only *possible* to *pay* that, which issuing from them, is able to be a ware or wares in the economic circulation. How free initiative, how human rights are to operate in making possible the

production of wares, this lies *outside* the economic circulation, even as the operation of the forces of nature lies outside the harvest yield in a bountiful or scant year. To the economic circulation, the spiritual organization and the *state too,* are individual producers of wares. Only, that which they produce is within their own domains not a ware; it only becomes a ware when it is taken up in the circulatory process of economic life. They do not carry on an economic activity within their domains; but the administration of the economic organism carries on an economic activity with that which they have performed.

The purely economic value of a ware (or of a performance), in so far as it is expressed in the money which represents its corresponding value, will depend upon the efficiency with which the *administration* of the economic life develops within the economic organism. It will depend upon the measures of this administration to what degree—based as it is upon the spiritual and the human-rights foundation, which are developed by the other organs of the social organism—the economic fertility will be able to develop itself. The money value of a ware will then be the expression for the fact that this ware is produced through the arrangements of the economic organism, in a quantity corresponding to requirements. If the presuppositions portrayed in this work are made real, then there will not be determinant for economic life that impulse which wants to amass wealth through the mere mass of production, but the production of wares will adapt itself to the requirements, through the arisal and most diverse inter-connection of co-operative associations. Hereby there will be established within the social organism that relation between money-value and the arrangements of production, which corresponds to these requirements. Money will really be only a measure of value; for behind each piece of money or certificate of value there will be the productive performance in the shape of a ware, because of which the possessor will alone have been able to come into possession of the money. It will

be necessary, of course, to make arrangements out of the nature of the particular circumstances which will deprive the money of its value to the possessor, when it has lost the importance just described. Such arrangements have already been pointed out. The ownership of money passes after a certain time to the commonality. And in order to prevent money in a productive concern from being held back by the possessors, re-coinage or re-print can take place from time to time. Out of such circumstances it will of course follow, that the amount of interest which a capital yields, will continually decrease, year by year. Money will wear out even as wares become worn out. But such a measure, which will be made by the state, will be just. "Interest upon interest" will be impossible. Whoever saves has of course made a performance which allows him to make a demand for a corresponding performance in wares, just as present performances may be traded for present wares; but such demands will be able to go only to a certain point, for demands which arise out of the past will be able to be satisfied only through the work of the present. Such demands may not become a power for economic oppression. Through the making real of these presuppositions the matter of an *"exchange-value"* will be placed upon a sound basis. For irrespective of what—because of other circumstances—the *form* of money may be, ... the *exchange value* will be the well ordered arrangement of the entire economic organism by its administrative body. The matter of *exchange-value* will never be satisfactorily solved by a state by means of *laws*. Present states will only solve this question if they for their part waive the attempt to solve it and allow the economic organism, which they must separate from themselves, to take the necessary steps.

Much is spoken of the modern division of labor, of the time it saves, of the perfection of wares it effects, of the exchange of wares it makes possible, and so forth; but very little attention is paid to the way in which this division of labor influences the relation of the individual

to his work-*performance*. Whoever works in a social organism that is based upon the division of labor, does not really ever *earn* his income through himself, but he earns it through the work of *all* of those who participate in the social organism. A tailor who makes a coat for his own use does not bring the coat into the same relation to himself as does the man in primitive conditions who has himself to make all those things that are necessary for the support of his life. The modern tailor makes a coat for himself in order to be able to make clothes for others; and the *value the coat* will have for himself depends entirely upon the performances of the others. The coat is in reality a means of production. Many a person will say that is conceptual hair-splitting. As soon as he carefully considers through what means wares *receive their value* in the economic circulation, he will no longer be able to hold this opinion. For he will see that in an economic organism resting on the division of labor, it is impossible to work for one's self. One can only work for others and let others work for one's self. One can no more work for one's self than one can eat up one's self. But it is possible to create arrangements which contradict the essential nature of the division of labor. This happens when the productive process is so ordered that the individual receives as property the production which he is able to make, thanks only to his position in the social organism. The division of labor forces the social organism to make the individual live within it in consonance with the conditions of the organism as a whole; the division of labor *economically* excludes egoism. If this egoism is nevertheless present in the shape of class privilege, and the like, a condition which is socially untenable arises, and leads to convulsions of the social organism. In such conditions do we now live. There may be many a person who does not think the demand worth considering, that the relations of human rights and other things must adapt themselves to the non-egoistic working of the division of labor; such a person may then draw the consequences of his presuppositions, namely, that it is impossible for us

to do anything and that the social movement can lead to nothing. It is true one cannot do anything worth while with regard to this movement, if one is unwilling to give *reality* its due. The manner of thought out of which the portrayal here given has been made, desires to have that which man must do within the social organism, done in accordance with that which follows out of the conditions of life of this organism.

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Whoever is able to form his concepts only in accordance with the arrangements to which he is accustomed, will become frightened when he hears that the relation of the leader of production to the workman is to be separated from the economic organism. For he will believe that such a separation will inevitably lead to a depreciation of money and to a return to primitive economic conditions. (Dr. Rathenau utters such an opinion in his essay, "After the Flood," which appears to be justified from *his* point of view.) But this danger will be counteracted by the Triorganation of the Social Organism. The economic organism standing on its own feet, in conjunction with the organism that takes care of human rights, completely separates the money relations from the relations of work which are based upon human rights. The relations of human rights will not immediately be able to exercise an influence upon money relations. For money relations are the result of the administration of the economic life. The legal relation of human rights that obtains between the leader of production and the workman will not be able to find expression one-sidedly in the value of money, for this is—after elimination of wage, which represents a relation of exchange between wares and working-power—simple the measure of the mutual value of wares (and of performances). Out of a consideration of the *effects* which Triorganation has upon the social organism, one must gain the conviction that this Triorganation of the Social Organism is not merely the present form of the state conceived somewhat differently, but that it will lead to quite other arrangements than

those are which are present in the form of the state that now obtains.

And within these new arrangements it will be possible to eradicate that which people now feel as the *class war*. For this war is based upon the harnessing of labor-wage in the economic circulation. This work portrays a form of the social organism in which the concept *labor-wage* finds as little realization as does the old *concept of property*. Only a very superficial judgment will be able to find that the realization of what has been here portrayed will produce no other effect than to change labor-wage into piece-work wage. It may be that a one-sided view of what has here been presented may lead to such an opinion. But *here* this one-sided view has not been characterized as the right view of the matter, which is: the substitution for the relation of wages-for-labor of the relation of *sharing*, with reference to that which has been performed through joint action of the leader of production and workman *in connection with all the arrangements of the social organism*. He, to whom that part of the yield of the productive process which the workman receives appears as piece-work wage, does not realize that *this* "piece-work wage" (which, however, is not in reality a "wage") finds its expression in the *value* of what has been performed in a manner which brings the social position of life of the workman in a relation to the position of other members of the social organism, which is quite different from the relation which has developed out of the one-sided class domination determined by economic conditions. The demand for the extirpation of the class war is hereby satisfied. And to him who confesses to the opinion—often heard in socialistic circles—that evolution itself must bring the solution of the social question, that it is impossible to present a view which shall be made real; the reply must be made: Of course, evolution will have to do its part; but in the social organism the ideational impulses of men are *realities*. And when time shall have advanced a little to that point where there has been made real what could only be thought today, then

this that has been made real will be actually contained in the evolution that has been made. And those who expect everything to come "from the evolutionary process alone," and who expect nothing to result from the presenting of fruitful ideas, will have to withhold their judgment until then when that which is being thought today will be evolution. But it will then be *too late* to accomplish certain things which are already demanded by the facts of *today*. It is impossible to make observations concerning the evolution of the social organism in the *objective* manner suited to the observation of evolution in nature. *We* have to *cause* the evolution of the social organism. Therefore, is it so dire a fate for a sound social thinking that so many opinions are opposed thereto, which want to "prove" what is socially necessary in the same way that one "proves" a matter in the natural sciences. A "proof" for a social conception of life can only come to him who is able to take up into his view not only *that* which exists in the *already-present,* but also *that* which lives as a germ in human impulses—very often unnoticed—and wants to realize itself.

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One of the effects by which the Triorganation of the Social Organism will have to prove its foundation in the essential nature of human social life, is the separation of judicial activity from the arrangements of the state. The state will have the task of determining the rights which are to obtain between people and groups of people. But the actual judging of disputes will have to take place in arrangements which arise out of the spiritual organization. The rendering of a proper judgment is in a high degree dependent upon the ability of the judge to have sympathy for and understanding of the individual position of the person to be judged. Such sympathy and understanding will only be present when the same bonds of confidence and faith by which men are drawn to the arrangements of the spiritual organization, furnish the basis for the institution of the courts. It is possible that the administration of the spiritual or-

ganization set up the judges, who can be taken from the various spiritual professions, and who will return to their professions again after the expiration of a certain time. Within certain limits, every person will then have the possibility of choosing for five or ten years from among the list of persons set up, the person to whom he has so much confidence that he will—in case the necessity should arise—submit to his judgment in a civil suit or criminal case. Within the environs of the place of dwelling of each person there will then always be so many judges that this choice will have a real importance. A plaintiff will always have to address himself to the judge who has jurisdiction for the person against whom complaint is made. Just consider what tremendous importance such an arrangement would have had for the regions of Austria-Hungary. In regions where various languages were current, the member of each nationality could have chosen a judge from among his own people. Whoever knows the conditions of Austria-Hungary will know how very much such an arrangement would have contributed to the peaceable adjustment of relations in the life of the various nationalities. But apart from nationality, there are broad domains of life for whose healthy development such an arrangement can work most fruitfully. For the technical knowledge of law the courts and judges of the above description will have officials for their aid, who will also be selected by the spiritual organism, but who will not themselves render decisions. Appellate courts will be built in the same manner out of the administration of the spiritual organism. It will be part of the essential nature of the life which develops out of the realization of the pre-suppositions just given, that a judge will be able to be in close touch with the habits of life and the nature of feeling of the people whose judge he is, that he will in that portion of his life lying outside his juristic activity—from which life his juristic activity will only withdraw him for a short while—become thoroughly conversant with the circle of life of those whose judge he is. Just as the healthy

social organism will in all its arrangements be based upon and take into consideration the social understanding of the people who participate in its life, so will things be also in the case of judicial activity. The execution and enforcement of the judgment is the work of the state, which is concerned with human rights.

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The arrangements which will become necessary—through the realization of what has been here portrayed—for other domains of life than those mentioned need not be here described, for the present at least. Such a description would of course occupy a space not to be measured.

The portrayal of the individual arrangements of life will have shown that the manner of thought which lies at the basis hereof is *not* concerned, as many may suppose—and as actually was imagined when I presented the matter orally at various quarters—with the renewal of the three estates or castes of artisans, soldiers and statesmen. The very opposite of such a separation into castes is here striven for. The people will be *socially* differentiated, *neither* in classes nor castes, but the social organism itself will be differentiated and made organic. The individual person will precisely thereby be able to be a human being in the true sense of the word; for the organation will be such that he will root with his very life in each of the three organs. He will have a professional interest for that organ of the social organism in which his profession places him; and he will have living relations to the other organs, for their arrangements will bear such a relation to him and his life as will demand and call forth such a living relation. The social organism which is distinct from man and which forms the basis for man's life will be triorganic; every person as such will be a connection between the three organs.

CHAPTER IV.

International Relations of Social Organisms.

THE internal organization of the sound social organism makes its international relations also triorganic. Each of the three domains will have its independent relationship to the corresponding domains of the other social organisms. Economic relations of one land to another will arise, without being immediately influenced by the relations to one another of the states, which are concerned with human rights. And conversely, the relation of the states, which are concerned with human rights, will within certain limits, develop in complete independence in the economic relations. Because of this independence in the *coming into existence* of the relations, they will be able in cases of conflict to act as a check and balance the one to the other. Communities of interests of the individual social organisms will result which will cause the boundary lines of country to appear insignificant for the living together of human beings. The spiritual organizations of the individual countries will be able to establish relations with one another which will result *only* out of the common spiritual life of mankind. The spiritual life standing on its own feet, independent of the state, will develop relations which are impossible where the recognition of spiritual performances is dependent not upon the administration of a spiritual organism, but upon the state. In this regard there is no difference between the performances of the palpably international science and those performances of other spiritual domains. A spiritual domain also, is the speech peculiar to a people and all of that which results in immediate connection with

speech. The folk-consciousness itself belong in this domain. The people of one speech-domain do not come into unnatural conflicts with those of another speech-domain, if they do not intend to use the organization of the state or of economic life or both to secure the preponderance of their folk-culture. If one folk-culture has a greater ability to spread and a higher spiritual fertility than another, then this spread will be justified and will occur in all peace and quietness, if it comes about only as the result of those arrangements which are dependent upon the spiritual organisms.

At present the Triorganation of the Social Organism will be most decidedly opposed by those connections of mankind which have developed out of the community of speech and folk-culture. This opposition will have to be broken by the goal which mankind as a whole will have—out of the life-necessities of more modern time—to place before itself with ever increasing consciousness. Modern mankind will feel that each one of its parts will be able to attain an existence truly worthy of man when it unites itself in the power and fulness of its life with all other parts. Folk-connections are, along with other natural impulses, the causes through which communities of right and economy have historically developed. But the powers through which the various folk-connections grow must develop in reciprocal re-actions which are not fettered by the relations which the state and economic bodies develop to each other. This will be achieved when the folk-communities carry out the internal triorganation of their social organisms so that each of the three organs can develop its independent relations to other social organisms.

Hereby connections of very *diversified forms between* peoples, states and economic bodies will arise—which will bind each part of mankind with other parts so that the one will feel within his own interests the life of the others. A league of peoples *arises* out of basic impulses in consonance with reality. It will not be necessary to "institute" it out of a one-sided view of rights.

Of especial importance for a type of thinking in consonance with reality, must be the fact that, although the goals of a social organism as here presented have their validity for the whole of mankind,they can nevertheless be realized by *every single* social organism irrespective of how other countries may for the present conduct themselves with regard thereto. If a social organism organates itself into the three domains demanded by nature, then the representatives of these three domains will be able as a united body to enter into relations with other social organisms, even when these latter have not themselves adopted the triorganic form of social life. Who takes the lead in this organation will work for a common human goal. What must be done will put itself through, far more because of the power which a goal rooted in real human impulses has *in life* than by declarations made in congress and from out conventions. This goal has been conceived upon a basis in consonance with reality; it can be striven for in real life at every point of human communal life.

Whoever has followed, from a point of view such as that of this exposition and presentation, the proceedings in the life of peoples and states in the last decades could observe how the structures of state as they have historically developed with their pooling of spirit, right, and economic life, brought themselves into international relations which strained toward a catastrophe. But similarly such an one could also see how the opposing forces out of unconscious human impulses pointed the way to triorganation. This will be the healing for the convulsions which the unitarian fanaticism has caused. But the life of those "leaders in control" of human affairs was not tuned to see what was for a long time preparing itself. In the spring and summer of 1914 one could still hear the "statesmen" talk about the fact that the peace of Europe, thanks to the efforts of the government, was in all human probability assured. Precisely these "statesmen" had no notion of the fact that what they said and did had nothing whatsoever any longer to do with the

cource of real events. But they were considered "the practical" men. And a foolish faddist would doubtless have been he, who, contrary to the fanciful view of the "statesmen," developed during the last decades a view such as the writer of these utterances presented long before the catastrophe of the war. His last statement in this regard was made in Vienna. Before a small circle (he would doubtless have been laughed at by a larger audience) he uttered concerning that which threatened, words as follows: "The tendencies of life dominant at present will continually grow stronger until they themselves destroy themselves. And here, he whose view is able to penetrate into the spiritual depths of social life, sees how frightful tendencies for the development of social festerings sprout up at all points. This is the great cultural anxiety for him who is able to look into and through life. This is the fearful moment which is so very oppressive, and which must inevitably cause one even then, if one were in all other regards able to suppress all enthusiasm for the means of a science of spiritual knowledge, to speak of the healing remedy in such a way that one is almost tempted to *cry out against* the world the words, ... "If the social organism continues to develop in the way in which it has developed up to now, then there will develop diseases of our culture which are for the social organism the same thing that *cancerous growths* are for the human natural organism." But the view of life of the ruling classes caused to grow upon this sub-stratum of life, which they could and would not see, a set of impulses which led to measures which should not have been undertaken, and to other measures which were not designed to form the basis for faith of the various human communities to one another. Whoever believes that the social life-necessities played no part as immediate causes of the present world catastrophe, let him reflect what would have become of the political impulses of the states which were straining for the war, if the "statesmen" had taken into the content of their will these social necessities. And what would have been

left undone, if, because of such a volitional content, the "statesmen" had had something else to do than to create the explosives which then had to bring about a detonation. If in the last decades one cast his view upon the insidious cancerous disease in the relations of states resulting from the social life of the leading portions of mankind, one was able to understand how a personality, who stood in general human spiritual interests, was able to say, in view of the expression which the social volition had assumed in these leading classes, "The goal is, to make of mankind in its last form a kingdom of brothers, who, following only the noblest impulses, move along in a common body. Whoever studies history only by the map of Europe, could believe a mutual general murder must fill out our very next future;" but only the thought that a "way to the true goods of human life" must be found is able to keep upright the sense for human worth. And this thought is such "as cannot be brought into consonance with our colossal military preparations and those of our neighbors. But I believe in this thought, and this thought will have to enlighten us, if it should not be better to abolish human life by common agreement and to fix the date for the suicide." (Uttered by Hermann Grimm in 1888 on page 46 of his book, "Aus den letzeten fünf Jahren.") What else were these "military preparations" than measures of those people who wanted to uphold structures of state in an unitarian form in spite of the fact that this form had, through the development of the new time, become contradictory to a healthy living together of the peoples? Such a healthy living together can, however, be brought about by that social organism which is formed out of the life necessities of the more modern time.

The Austro-Hungarian structure of state had been straining for more than half a century for a new form. The spiritual life which was rooted in a complexity of folk-communities demanded a form for whose development the old unitarian state, built as it was out of impulses that had long since ceased to be active, was a

hindrance. The Serbo-Austrian conflict, which stands at the point of departure of the catastrophe of the World War, is good and sufficient evidence for the fact that the political boundaries of this unitarian state after a certain time could no longer be cultural boundaries for the living together of the peoples. A spiritual life which had stood on its own feet independent of the political state and its boundaries, would have been able to develop itself beyond those boundaries in a way which would have been in consonance with the goals of the peoples. Such a development appeared to everyone in Austria-Hungary who fancied himself to be a "statesman-like" thinker, a total impossibility or even complete nonsense. The habits of thought of such persons permitted no other idea than the conception that the boundaries of the state are identical with the boundaries of national community of sentiment. To comprehend that spiritual organizations can arise which disregard the boundaries of state and which include within their operation schools and other branches of the spiritual life, this was repugnant to these habits of thought. But, nevertheless, this "not-to-be-thought-of" is the demand of more modern times for international life. The person of practical thought may not remain standing in front of the apparently impossible and indulge the belief that arrangements in the spirit of these demands will meet with insurmountable obstacles; but he must direct his effort precisely to the conquering of these obstacles. Instead of bringing the "statesman-like" thinking into a direction which would have taken into account the demands of the present era, people strained their energies to make arrangements which were to maintain the unitarian state against these demands. Because of this, the state was made into an increasingly impossible structure. And in the second decade of the twentieth century the state was face to face with the situation of not being able to do anything for the continuance of its existence in the old form and of having either to await its dissolution or to make the attempt of supporting the structure, that had decayed

within, from without by means of the force which was based upon the measures of the war. In 1914 there was for the Austro-Hungarian "statesmen" no other choice, either they had to direct their intentions in the direction of the life requirements of a sound social organism and to proclaim this, their will, to the world, which would have been able to awaken new faith, or they *had* to unfetter a war in order to keep upright the old impossible order. Only he who judges from out these facts what happened in 1914 will be able to think justly concerning the matter of blame for the war. Because of the participation of many nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian structure of state, this country had the task of world importance of developing first of all the sound and healthy social organism. This unique task and mission was not recognized. This sin against the spirit of historical development of the world, drove Austria-Hungary into the war.

And the German Empire? It was founded at a time when the demands of the new era for the sound and healthy social organism were striving to be realized. The realization of these demands would have been able to give to the empire an historical justification for its existence in the world. The social impulses were linked together in this middle European empire as in a domain which seemed to be pre-destined by the history of the world for their realization in life. Social thought cropped up at many points in the world. But in the German Empire it assumed a peculiar form from which could be seen where it was tending. This fact should have given to this empire a content of work. This fact should have given to the administrators of this empire their task. The justification for the existence of the empire in the modern family of nations could have been given, if the new-founded empire had been given a content of work which was demanded by the forces of history itself. Instead of attacking this task in a large way, the Germans were content to institute "social reforms" which were suggested by the demands of the minute, and were delighted when the other nations admired the

perfection of these reforms. Side by side with this, the attempt was made to establish the external world power of the empire upon forms which were developed out of the conceptions of the might and splendor of states which had long since become mummified corpses. An empire was built which, precisely as the Austro-Hungarian structure of state, flatly contradicted those forces in the life of people of modern times which had historically made their debut. Of these forces the administrators of the German Empire saw nothing. *That* structure of state which they had in view could only rest upon the power of the military. That which is demanded by more modern history could only have been based upon the realization of the impulses for the healthy and sound social organism. With the striving for the realization of *these* impulses, the German Empire would have assumed a different position in the community of life of modern peoples than that was in which the empire stood in 1914. Because of its not-understanding of the modern demands of life of peoples, the German policy had in 1914 reached the zero point of its possibility of operation. It had in the last decades noticed nothing of that which should have been done; it had dabbled and engaged in everything that did not lie in the modern forces of development and which, because of its total lack of content, *had* "to tumble down like a house of cards."

A true reflection and picture of this, which developed out of the course of history as the tragic fate of the German Empire, would be given if it were possible carefully to examine and faithfully to present to the world the proceedings which occurred in official circles at Berlin at the end of July and the beginning of August, 1914. Very little indeed of these proceedings is known within or without Germany. He who knows what happened in them knows how in these proceedings the German policy proved to be a veritable house of cards, and how because the German policy had reached the dead center of the possibility even of acting, the entire decision whether and how the war was to be begun *had* to slip

over into the judgment of the military administration. He who was responsible for the military administration could then, in the circumstances in which the imbecile polity of the government had placed him, *not act otherwise*, from a military point of view, *than* he acted, because from a *military* point of view the situation could be seen only as it was seen. For outside of the military domain, the German government had got itself in such a box in which there simply was no possibility whatsoever of acting. All this would be proven as a world historical fact, if anyone should arise who is able to bring to the light of day the proceedings in Berlin at the end of July and 1st of August, especially all that occurred on the 31st of July and the 1st of August. We are still possessed by the illusion that the insight into these proceedings cannot be of any particular value since we know the preparatory happenings out of the time that preceded. But if anyone wants to speak about the question "who's to be blamed" for the war, he may not leave out of account the insight into these proceedings. Of course it is possible to learn about the causes for the war, which were existent very long before, by other means; but the insight into these proceedings shows *how* these causes operated.

The conceptions which at that time forced Germany's leaders into the war continued to operate in a way most fateful. They became popular sentiment in Germany. And they prevented during the last so frightful years, *that* insight from developing in the minds of the persons in power whose absence and non-existence had previously driven them into the tragedy. Upon the possible receptivity which might have resulted from these experiences, did the writer of these utterances hope to build, when he made the effort within Germany and Austria at that point in the catastrophe of the war which seemed to him most favorable, to bring the ideas of the healthy and sound social organism and the consequences thereof for external political action, to personalities whose influence at that time could have been instrumental in se-

curing acceptance for these impulses. Personalities whose intentions for the fate of the German people were most sincere and honest, participated in the attempt to secure such acceptance for these ideas. It was in vain. The habits of thought of the persons in power resisted such impulses, which seemed to those men who were possessed of military concepts *alone,* to be something with which nothing worth while at all could be accomplished. The most such persons could see was, "separation of church and school," that might be something. Precisely in such channels had the thoughts of the persons with "statesmen-like" ideas for a long time been running, and they could not be brought into a direction which would lead to something really thorough-going. Well-intentioned persons suggested that I "publish" these thoughts. This was, at that time, the most ill-advised counsel possible. What would have been accomplished, if, in the domain of "literature" among other things mention were made of these impulses . . . . by a private individual? It is inherent in the nature of these impulses that they could have had importance *at that time* only by virtue of the place from which they were uttered. The people of middle Europe could have seen, if utterances in the sense of these impulses had been made from the proper place, that there is something which is able to take into account their more or less conscious striving. And the people of the Russian East would certainly at that time have had an understanding for the relieving of the czaristic regime through these impulses. That the Russians would have had the necessary understanding herefor can be doubted only by him who has no feeling for the receptivity of the still virgin intellect of the east Europeans for sound and healthy social ideas. Instead of utterances in the sense of these ideas, came Brest-Litowsk.

That military thinking was unable to stave off the catastrophe of middle and eastern Europe, this could not be grasped—by military thinking. Because people did not wish to believe in the inevitableness of the catastro-

phe, this is the cause for the terrible misfortune of the German people. No one wanted to recognize how that in those places where the decisions rested, there was absolutely no sense for world historic necessities. Whoever knew anything of these necessities, he also knew how the English-speaking peoples had personalities in their midst who saw and grasped what was moving and alive in the powers of the folks of middle and eastern Europe. Such an one knew how such personalities were of the conviction: in middle and eastern Europe something is preparing itself which must live itself out in mighty social upheavals, in social upheavals concerning which they believed; there is in English-speaking domains neither an historical necessity nor yet a possibility for such upheavals. These thoughts formed the basis for the English policy. In middle and eastern Europe nothing of all this was seen. On the contrary, the policy was so directed that it had to "tumble to pieces like a house of cards." Only a policy based upon the insight that in English-speaking domains people were reckoning in a very large way with historical necessities—quite naturally from the English point of view—would have had firm ground to stand upon. But the suggestions for such a policy would in all probability have appeared, especially to the "diplomats," superfluous in the highest degree.

Instead of carrying out such a policy which could have led middle and eastern Europe to a happy issue of events, in spite of the largeness and fore-sightedness of the English policy, the Germans continued to move on in the old diplomatic ruts. And during the horrors of the war even, they did not learn out of bitter experience that it was necessary to oppose to the task which America had set the world in political proclamations, a task that was born out of European life. Between the task which Wilson had proclaimed from out an American point of view, and the task which would have mingled its voice amid the thunder of the cannon as the spiritual impulse of Europe, an understanding would have been possible. All other talk about an understanding rang hollow in the

face of the historical necessities. But those who, in the nature of events, came into the administration of the German Empire, lacked all sense for propounding a task out of the grasping of the forces that were sprouting up in the life of more modern mankind. And consequently the Fall of 1918 had to bring what it did. The military break-down was accompanied by a spiritual capitulation. Instead of summoning up strength at this time at least, and securing out of European willing recognition for the spiritual impulses of the German people, came the mere submission to Wilson's fourteen points. To Wilson a Germany was brought that had no wishes of its own. However Wilson may think about his own fourteen points, he could only aid Germany in that which Germany itself wanted. He most certainly must have expected an utterance of this will. The imbecility of the policy at the beginning of the war was followed by that other of October, 1918; was followed by the terrible spiritual capitulation brought about by a man in whom many in the German lands had placed a sort of last hope.

Disbelief in an insight gained out of the historical workings of forces; prejudice and refusal to consider impulses which result from the knowledge of spiritual connections; this has brought about the situation of middle Europe. Now a new situation has been brought about by the facts which have resulted from the workings of the catastrophe of the war. The situation can be characterized through the idea of the social impulses of mankind as they are meant in this work. These social impulses speak a language with reference to which the whole civilized world has a task. Shall the thinking concerning that which must occur today with reference to the social question, reach the dead center as middle European policy did in 1914 with respect to its tasks? Countries which were able to remain apart from the affairs then in question may not remain standing apart with reference to the social movement. With reference to this question there ought to be no political opponents, no neutrals; there ought to be only a humanity working to-

gether, which is inclined to recognize the signs of the times and to adapt their actions according to these signs.

Out of the intentions which are presented in this work will be seen why the "Call to the German People and to the Civilized World," which is reproduced in the following chapter, was written by the author of this work, some time ago and presented to the world, first of all to the peoples of middle Europe, by a committee which had acquired an understanding for it. At present other circumstances obtain than obtained at the time when its content was made known to a small circle. At that time the sentiment of the public would inevitably have made of it "literature." Today the public must bring to this Call what it could not have brought to the Call a short time ago; understanding people who want to work in its sense if the Call is worth their understanding. For what must now come into existence can only come into existence through such people. The response and support which the Call has already received, as may be seen from the signatures which have already been affixed thereto, may be an indication for the fact that there are such people. The author of this work believes the time demands that the number of such people become as large as possible in very brief time. For his opinion is, that upon such persons will depend the possibility of bringing about a future of world development compatible with life. Even if the realization of the ideas presented in this work and in the Call should lead to something totally different than that which has been immediately presented here, this would not be contrary to the intentions of the author. Ideas which have been taken from the observation of realities, intend to be impulses and not programs concerning which one indulges the fancy that they can be carried out in the literal sense of the word. The author stated this to all of those to whom under the force of events of the time he spoke of these ideas. He always said, it may possibly be that when one sets about realizing these ideas much of what has been said will modify itself; but what he believes is, that with *such* ideas present

life will be taken hold of in a way corresponding to reality, and consequently what results from such a taking-hold will be something that meets the real demands of the time. Up till now the following Call has been published in quite a large number of German, Austrian and Swiss papers.

CHAPTER V.

Appendix.

To the German People and to the Civilized World:

SECURELY built for untold ages to come, was, in the opinion of the German people, their empire, erected half a century ago. In August, 1914, the German people believed that the catastrophe of war at the beginning of which they saw themselves placed, would prove this structure to be invincible. Today the German people can look only upon the shattered ruins of this structure. Sober thinking concerning one's self ought to occur after such an experience. For this experience has proven the opinion of half a century, has especially proven the dominant thoughts of the years of war, to be an error which has produced a terrible tragedy. Where do the grounds lie for this tragic error? This question must force a thorough-going, self-examination into the souls of the members of the German folk. The possibility of life of the German people depends upon whether the strength for such a self-examination is now present. The future of the German people depends upon whether it is able seriously to put to itself the question: How did I fall into my error? If it puts to itself this question today, the knowledge will dawn upon it, that it erected an empire half a century ago, but neglected to give to this empire a task in consonance with and sprung from the essential nature of the German folk. The empire was founded. In the first period of its existence the effort was made to bring its inner possibilities of life in order, according to the demands which appeared out of old traditions and new requirements

from year to year. Later, one proceeded to make fast and enlarge the external position of power that was based in material forces. In connection herewith measures were carried out with regard to the social demands born out of the new time. These measures took into consideration many a point which the day proved to be necessary. But these measures nevertheless lacked a large and great goal such as should have resulted from a knowledge of the forces of development to which more modern mankind must turn. Accordingly, the empire was placed in the connection of the world without an essential goal or purpose, without a goal which justified its existence. The course of events of the war-catastrophe disclosed this in a very sorrowful manner. Until the outbreak of this catastrophe the non-German peoples had been able to see nothing in the conduct of the Empire, which was able to awaken in them the opinion: the administrators of this empire are fulfilling a world-historic mission which may not be swept away. The not-finding of such a mission by the administrators of the German Empire, necessarily caused that opinion to arise in the non-German world, which is—in the knowledge of him who is able to penetrate to the depths of the situation—the deeper ground for the German break-down.

Incalculably much now hangs for the German people upon its unbiased judging of this situation of affairs. In misfortune that insight ought to arise which has not cared to show itself in the last fifty years. In place of petty thinking about the immediate demands of the minute, there ought to take place a large and broad trend for a view of life which strives to learn with strong thoughts the forces of development of more modern mankind, and which, with courageous will, devotes itself to the service of these forces. The tendency in pettiness to side-track all those as unpractical idealists who direct their view to these forces of development, ought now to cease. There ought to cease the arrogance and pride of those who fancy themselves persons of practical life, but whose narrow-mindedness, masquerading as practically, has brought

about the misfortune. There ought now to be taken into most serious consideration, what the in truth real practicians of life, who have been decried as idealists, have to say about the developmental requirements of the newer time.

The "practicians" of all directions saw indeed for a long time, the coming up of completely new demands by humanity. But they wanted to do justice to these demands within the frame and boundary of traditional habits of thought and of traditional institutions and arrangements. The economic life of more modern time brought forth these demands. Their satisfaction through the means of private initiative seemed impossible. The transference of private work into public work appeared in the opinion of one class to be necessary *in particular domains.* And this transference was carried through at those points where it seemed advantageous to this class according to its view of life. A radical transference of *all* individual work into public work became the goal of another class, which through the development of the newer economic life had no interest in the maintenance of the traditional private goals.

All efforts and strivings with reference to the newer demands of humanity which have up to now appeared, have one basic element in common. They are straining for the making public of what is private, and they count in this their striving upon the taking over of the private concerns by communities (state or commune) which are sprung out of pre-suppositions which have nothing to do with these newer demands. Or also, hope is placed upon newer societies (e. g., co-operative associations) which are developed not in complete accord with these new demands but which are sprung out of traditional habits of thought patterned after the old forms.

The truth is, that no community that is fashioned in the sense of these old habits of thought, can take up into itself that which is demanded it shall take up. The forces of the time are straining for the knowledge and recognition of a social structure of mankind which takes

into view quite other things than what is today commonly taken into view. The social communities have up till now for the most part builded themselves out of the social instincts of mankind. To saturate the powers of these instincts with full consciousness is the task of the time.

The social organism is organated as is the natural organism. And just as the natural organism has to carry out its thinking through the head and not through the lungs, so is there necessary in the social organism an organation into systems of which no one can assume the task of the others, but each of which, with full guarantee of its own independence, must work together with the others.

The economic life can only prosper if it, as an organ standing on its own feet, develops itself according to its own forces and laws, and if confusion is not brought into its workings by its being absorbed by another organ of the social organism, the organ, namely, that is politically active. This politically active organ must rather stand on its own feet side by side with the economic organ, just as in the natural organism the breathing system exists side by side with the head system. Their healthy and wholesome working together can not be attained by having both organs cared for by a single legislative and administrative organ, but by having each have its own law-making and administration, which livingly work together. For the political system must ruin economic life if it assumes control of it; and the economic system loses its life force if it tries to become political.

Into an association with these two organs of the social organism, standing on its own feet and built up out of its own conditions and possibilities of life, there must come a third organ, the organ of spiritual production, to which organ the spiritual part of the other two domains also belongs. Their spiritual part must be given to the other two organs by the third organ, which is also fitted out with its own law-making and administrative body; but this their spiritual part may not be otherwise influenced or administrated by them than the organic mem-

bers of a natural total organism which exist side by side mutually influence each other.

It is already possible today to give a full and valid scientific basis and development to what has here been said concerning the necessities of the social organism. In these utterances it is possible only to put the directive line for those who want to investigate and follow up these necessities.

The founding of the German Empire occurred at a time when these necessities presented themselves to newer mankind. The administration of this empire did not understand how to give the empire a task in life born out of these necessities. Such a task would not only have given to the empire the proper internal structure, it would also have given to its external policy a justifiable direction. With such a policy the German people would have been able to live harmoniously with the non-German peoples.

Now, out of misfortune, insight ought to ripen. The German people ought to develop the will to a possible social organism. Not a Germany that no longer exists ought to face the world, but the representatives of a spiritual, a political and an economic system ought to show the will to confer, as self-sustaining delegations, with those by whom that Germany has been cast to earth, whose mixture of the three systems had made of it an impossible social structure.

It is possible to hear, in spirit, the practicians who expatiate upon the complexity of what is here said, who find it troublesome and difficult even to think about the working together of three bodies, because they do not care to know anything about the real demands of life, but who have the desire to shape everything according to the easy and comfortable demands of *their* thinking. They will have to realize: either people will accommodate themselves and adapt their thinking to the demands of reality or they will refuse to learn from their misfortune and will multiply the misfortune that already exists to infinity.

February, 1919. Dr. Rudolf Steiner.

(True love begins at home and with one's neighbor. Just as Rudolf Steiner tried throughout the war to bring reason into the minds of those "leaders" in Germany who had literally run amuck, so did he first of all speak to the German people, as is evident from the preceding, and then to the entire civilized world. Committees of prominent business, industrial and professional men in Europe actively support this Call. Many thousands of men and women of all walks of life in all European countries already realize that the Triorganation of the Social Organism is *the* great demand of the present. Their names are not here set forth because it is quite immaterial to the American people what other people think. The **American** will decide on his course of action purely on the basis of **his own** power of reason, insight and will. It is, however, a matter of fundamental importance that the American citizen soon realize, through the power of his own independent thinking, what James Bryce clearly saw, viz., that it is quite immaterial who is elected president. A stream cannot rise higher than its source. And nothing and nobody born out of party concepts, is in any way able to grapple with the question that is disrupting our whole society. Individuals who clearly see, or even merely instinctively feel, the necessity for the Triorganation of our Social Organism, and who are willing to work for this Triorganation, can alone give to the course of events that direction which will keep our society from shattering to pieces.—THE TRANSLATOR.)



The Goetheanum. View from the west.

THE GOETHEANUM AND THE VOICE OF THE PRESENT.

THE Goetheanum in Dornach bei Basel, Switzerland, is to be a high school for Spiritual Science and a place of nurture for such an artistic life which is conducted in the manner of this science. Its erection was begun in the Spring of 1914. During the war work was done on it. The containing walls with the intersecting cupolas are completed. Their architectonically plastic forms, the frescoes of the interior, the glass windows made according to entirely new methods, already show the visitor what sort of an exterior is planned for the scientific and artistic work which is to be performed at this place.

Not a building in an historically inherited form of art has been erected in Dornach; what may already be seen shows that a new architectural style and form of

The Gotheanum. View from the north.

artistic execution has been attempted. The structure as a whole and every detail are issued from out the same spirit which would at this place make for itself a focus of its activity.

This spirit would serve the building-up anew of scientific, mental and social life. It is grown out of the conviction that the constitution of the human soul, which had at the beginning of the twentieth century reached its climax, is intimately woven together with the destructive forces which have revealed their true form in the world catastrophe.

Just as the building in its configuration and form would represent a unity with all that which is to be performed within it, so is it the endeavor that the spiritual life which issues from Dornach shall develop that driving force of soul which can be form-giving for a true moral, social and technical practice of life.

For modern man a gulf intervened between his experience of soul and the practice of life. Through illu-

sions he concealed from himself this abyss. He held the belief that he was drawing science and art out of the reality of life and that he was saturating this reality with his spirit. These illusions are the true causes of the devastating catastrophe of the world and of the crying social needs of the present. Modern man did not find in science and art the spirit; therefore his practice of life became a routine lacking in spirit.

The social practice of life, the mechanical technique, the superficial and external life of justice lack motive forces which can only arise when within men the souls experience the spirit.

The Spiritual Science to be cultivated in the Goetheanum at Dornach has produced a social view of life, the impulse for the Triorganation of the Social Organism, which would gain genuine practice of life out of true knowledge of the spirit, which would avoid all utopianisms through the fact working from out spirit reality.

What the souls need in order to experience their full humanity is to be cultivated in Dornach, precisely as are the technical requirements of external life. The direction of spirit which purposes to build a focus for itself here, would work for the place of industry of a life-enhancing technique, for the social form-giving of human labor, precisely as for the building-up of the life of soul. It imperatively needs the co-operation of all those who are open-minded enough to see that modern life lacks precisely this, which this spirit would create.

In order to complete the building at Dornach there is still necessary just as much willingness to sacrifice on the part of such open-minded as has already been evinced in the possibility of bringing it to its present stage. But even with the completion of this building nothing will have been achieved for the goals which are to be served by it. Parallel with this completion there must go practical institutions of life which are formed in the direction of the spiritual work represented by it. Most practical institutions of life, as technical and social undertakings, must

prove the ability of its powers to enhance life. uch a prove the ability of its powers to enhance life. Such a pass must be reached that it no longer will provoke laughter when the spirit that would create a philosophy of life also is active in the organization of technical and industrial undertakings, financial institutions, and institutes of scientific research.

In the Free Waldorf School at Stuttgart the direction of spirit here meant is already operative. Even such persons who tolerate this direction of spirit at this place, because it carries on its activity on a "cultural" plane, will today still demand that it "leave its hands off" institutions concerning which only the "practician" is competent to judge.

In this domain one of the mightiest prejudices has to be overcome. The personalities who have today already found themselves in willingness to co-operate in the overcoming of this prejudice through practical work, expose themselves to the reproach of faddism that is foreign to life. They believe they know that mankind will only then emerge from many a crying need when the vain faddism of those people has been penetrated and recognized, who today are falsely calling them faddists. But the number of the personalities who today, despite the just mentioned reproach, are willing to place their powers in the service of true practice of life, is still small. Arrangements are in process of arising which would make a foundation for this practice of life. Whether this can succeed will depend upon the circumstance that as great a number of people as possible find themselves, who want to co-operate with these few.

Upon an international basis alone will it be possible to work happily in this direction. For to the spirit that is here meant, a narrow-hearted erection of human barriers is, according to the nature of its being, quite foreign. Necessity to it, however, is the unified comprehension and grasps of the life of soul and of practical material life. Out of this hidden depth it would perform its work for the mastery of the "social question," too. It believes

to be able to say in all modesty, that it was already working in this sense within small circles, before, in the outbreak of the world catastrophe, its antithesis showed its true face. It is apparent to it that before this loud-speaking fact it could be heard by a few only. It believes that now, out of the crying necessities of the time, understanding ought to be brought it. With leagues of nations out of the old spirit, the growth of the new life will not be helped; out of the new spirit the league of nations will grow as a matter of course. The old constitutions of soul will not bear any new social life; out of the renewing of the life of the soul the new social upbuilding will result from inner necessity.

Many a man is already saying today, a vivifying of the dead or fainting human powers out of the spirit is necessary. But on closer observation the question remains without answer: What is the *content* of the new spirit? In the Goetheanum at Dornach, however, we would speak precisely concerning *this content;* we would work for this content. For not the mere appeal to the spirit can help at this time, but only the recognized spirit, the spirit that is taken up into the work of our life. But this spirit must itself be achieved. It wants to penetrate and saturate all scientific research; not merely be tolerated by a science that keeps itself aloof and apart from it. It does not want to be here in order that the man who works in the factory find it when he leaves the factory; it wants to live in the work of the factory itself, in its technical and economic direction. It does not want a practice of life that leaves "time free for spiritual interests also;" it does not want to have any time remaining in which it does not work. It does not want an art that "beautifies" sober life; it is perfectly cognizant and aware that true life of itself and quite as a matter of course assumes artistic form.

Thus is Dornach, and what hangs togethere therewith, conceived; it can become complete reality if people will recognize how this "thought" wants to work from out the roots of life. Rudolf Steiner.

THE GOETHEANUM, A BEACON AND A CHALLENGE.

Rudolf Steiner, in a lecture delivered in 1888 before the Goethe-Verein of Vienna, declared that Goethe's way of looking at the world was able to give us a new aesthetics. That we human begins of today really need a new aesthetics, one that can make our art pregnant with life, is apparent to the layman as well as to the serious student. If our art knows no other principle than imitation of nature or past productions, it is bound to remain sterile, a hobby of "aesthetes" and wealthy know-nothings who want to buy "culture's" overcoat. In the age of the motion picture and colored photography and the rotograph press, it is difficult to see what function an art, that merely imitates, has in our society, other than that of wealthy exclusiveness. An art serving this function, and who will dare say that our art of today does aught else, cannot speak to the soul of the great mass of mankind. But what other business, pray, has art than to give through the senses to the souls of the masses of mankind, the *feeling* for those truths which only the initiate is able to grasp in their living reality? In the Grecian epoch, that epoch which represents a highest development of art, the people who listened to the rhythmic flow of Homer's song, were enraptured for and received a fortaste of that which Pythagoras was able directly to perceive as the harmony of the spheres. "And—so say the descriptions, reports and testimonies of the ancients—the mobs who crowded to Olympia to see the games, upon beholding the Olympian Jupiter, were seized by the feeling that everything of splendor, majestic-awe, and lovableness was concentrated in this form. In the Olympian Jupiter the human form was given qualities of soul, whereby man was lifted above himself to a point where

he was, as it were, apotheosized for the present in which past and future are contained. The god had become man in order to lift man to the plane of god-head. The people beheld the highest dignity and were enthused for the highest beauty."*

The Greeks were able to attain this perfection of art merely by the imitation of nature, because they had not become estranged to nature as we have become. Their happy physical and psychical constitution enabled them to commune with the fauns and gnomes and centaurs and satyrs and sylphs. These, for the Greek, were not extra-natural beings, they were beings eminently *within* and part of nature. Nature herself created the demands of the Greek soul. The Greek artist therefore, needed no other principle than imitation of nature in her entirety, in order to satisfy the demands of his people. The Greek freely abandoned himself to nature. She not only created the demands of his soul, she also satisfied these demands by the art she directly inspired. Because the Greek people had no demand that did not originate in nature, the Grecian artist had only to give plastic form to nature in her entirety, make her present to the senses, and the longing of the Greek soul was satisfied. Modern man does not and cannot any longer freely abandon himself to nature, that she create and satisfy his demands. The demands of our life are not brought about by a soulful nature, but in very high degree by soulless machines. We have become so estranged to nature that she no longer is our fostering mother. Nature is to us merely a factor in the economic process, a factor that is not yet quite constant, it is true. But doubtless some enterprising Edison will soon apply for a patent on a regulator of sunshine, wind velocity and rain-fall! Mere imitation of nature cannot give us what our souls demand, because we have outgrown nature. We laugh a good deal at the German university professors, who, by their reading of their manuscripts to

* Goethe, in his book on Winkelmann.

their hearers, try to keep a corner on their knowledge, try to ignore Gutenberg's invention of the printing press. We rightly ascribe the catastrophe, that has overtaken the German people, in no small degree to the fact that their whole official cultural life was a lie, being nothing else than the infiltration (Einpauken, is what the Germans call it. Pauke is a bass drum) of a mass of dead facts which have no other purpose in life than that they give so and so many professors holding state appointments, the opportunity of earning an easy living by ramming them into those who are compelled by the state to suffer the treatment. Looking across the water we can very well see that this bureaucratic, state-controlled education and culture is in no small degree responsible, in the last analysis, for the calamity that has overtaken Germany. But, looking at ourselves, we do not realize that an art which spends its time in painting, in chemically pure oil, likenesses of—well, say, profiteers created in the image of the machine—an art that tries to ignore the invention of the kodak by doing laboriously and only more or less well what the camera does much better, such an art is in precisely the position of the official culture of Germany. The people who carry out these manipulations termed art, may secure a comfortable living thereby. But let such people not suppose that they are doing anything to meet the great and crying longing for art of the soul of the proletariat. Tight-harnessed to the tread-mill of economic life, the proletariat of the whole world is longing for some vision of hope, something that will enable it to feel its human worth. Where are the artists who can meet this demand? Let not anyone fancy this a trivial matter. A proletariat, to whom the genius embodied in poet or artist has given an inspiring vision of divine truth and thereby of human worth, since man's soul vibrates in sympathy with this vision of divine truth, such a proletariat will put forth its demands in quite a different way than will the one that believes in nothing else, because it has seen nothing else, than the inevitable determinateness of the economic

process. And a society where art (and culture generally) is a lap-dog of the rich or of the state, lacks the very basic element of faith which enables man fruitfully to work with man. Such a society is bound to suffer a catastrophe sooner or later.

But how is the artist to set to work, who would bring to the masses of his fellow men the feeling of their divine origin? He will look at the world with and through Goethe's eyes, and himself first get the vision. How did Goethe look at the world? Goethe *experienced* the primal plant, that living, evermoving, constantly metamorphosing being which produces all plant life, which brings forth a myriad of plant forms in order to express itself, which succeeds in completely expressing itself in no one form or species, but which does reveal some part of itself in every plant form. When Goethe told Schiller of this *experience,* Schiller said, why that is no experience, that is the idea of the plant. Not being a professor of philosophy, Goethe could not argue the matter, but in his soul he knew what he knew. To him the primal plant was just as truly a matter of experience, and the fact that every bone in our body is merely a metamorphosis of a link of the spinal column was just as truly a matter of experience, as was the fact that colored light throws a shadow of the complementary color. But only Goethes are able to "see" the primal plant, to see and hear nature at work and observe her at it; only the genius is willing and able to be a Prometheus and bring a spark of the divine fire down from Olympus so that mortal man may warm himself. And consequently the very heart of the Goetheanistic aesthetics, art, science and Weltauschaning, is the genius. A Darwinistic age has no need of the genius. It would not know what to do with it. It muddles ahead, mechanically successfully, without divine vision. A Goetheanistic age cannot exist without its genius. A people so constituted that its soul imperatively needs a genius, but which fails to find or recognize its genius, dies of a broken heart of unsatisfied longings. In this

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position is the German people today. The great mass of the German people does not know why this catastrophe has broken in upon it. Incomprehensible to us though it be, it is nevertheless a fact; the mass of the German people has no bitterness in its heart. It endures and suffers all the calamities which have overtaken it, with eyes wide open with wonder and with the mute question in its soul: Why has all this happened, I wonder? In the last analysis this has all happened because the German people followed Darwin instead of Goethe. The Anglo-Saxon can accept the Darwinistic habit of thought (because he has a compartmental mind) and still live. But it is certain death to the German soul. In Germany we see tragically verified, "where there is no vision the people perish."

The proletariat of all lands is in the condition of Germany. It is seeking—consciously or unconsiously—for a vision of divine truth, a vision that will let it feel what it means to be a human being. This is the crying demand of the proletariat in all countries. What is offered to the proletariat? Economic science, the so-called science of society, all the natural sciences as conducted today, if they have the courage of their premises all tell the proletarian: Man is not a spirit-individual, man is an automaton of the economic process. (What Goethe called Homunculus.) The highest flight of our modern "vision" is to organize "institutions for social uplift." These try to produce a somewhat better type of automaton (Homunculus) within a limited field by bettering the economic process for a few copies of the genus man. But the real proletariat is only insulted by such petty-fogging. And with one accord it cries: "If it be true that man's life is determined by the economic process, why then in heaven's name let *us* get control of this economic process so that *we* may be men and not merely cogs in the machine." We may temporize, stave off the evil day for a space by building five new prisons per state all around as New York is doing, and putting the strikers and agitators in these prisons, but

as certain as two and two make four it is only a matter of time until the whole world will be in the position of Russia, unless a different type of *thinking* comes into the souls of men. There is one thing and only one that can prevent a general Bolshevization of the world, with the attendant destruction and waste of human values inseparable from the process of getting there, and this one thing is a vision of the divine which is able to lift up the souls of men and let them feel their human worth by showing them their divine origin. Such a vision can come only through a genius. The proletariat of the whole world, consciously or unconsciously, is waiting and longing for the genius who will in poetry, painting, and sculpture, in music, religion and science, give us the vision of the Olympian Zeus that we need for our lives today.

In view of this situation of the world, a building is of compelling interest that has been erected in Switzerland by Rudolf Steiner. We have noted that the conditions of our life, our estrangement from nature, make it necessary for the artist who would speak to our souls, not merely to imitate nature, but to surpass nature. Only that art can satisfy our souls today, which is truer than nature, which shows us that which nature would be but can't. This, of course, is what great art has always done. Great art has always clothed material in divine garments. The point of difference to be noted in the way, in the manner of artistic activity and creation between the Greeks and ourselves is, that the Greeks could give a divine form to material, in original naivitee. In laying hold on the idea and in givingly marble the form of the idea, the Greeks did not feel that they had gone outside nature. They felt themselves to be completely *within* nature during the whole of the activity. To them the idea was just as much a part of nature as was physical reality. As opposed to this, *we* find, feel or make a distinction between the "world of nature" and the "world of idea." In order to get at the idea, we have consciously to make a jump, to bridge the chasm

that separates the world of nature from the world of idea. The bridging of this separating chasm by the more emotional route through the development of feeling, is art and religion; the bridging of this separating chasm by the more intellectual route through the development of thinking, is science. But now, a tree for instance, has many sides. And it often has a very different appearance from different sides. To get a view of the whole tree it is necessary to go completely round it, to see it from all sides. And so, because of the fact that mankind is constantly evolving and has developed since the Greek epoch, the human spirit, when man today consciously bridges the chasm—which did not exist for the Greeks—which separates the world of nature from the world of idea, views the idea so to speak from a different angle or side. There is no question that the Parthenon gives an ideal form to marble. The self-contained harmony and proportion of the Parthenon let us feel to the very depth of our souls, what the idea of a crystal must be like. And so it is impossible to think of the Partenon being built in anything but marble. The common man of Greece, contemplating this building, felt: here is real beauty. He could feel something of the divine harmony and order of the universe which Pythogoras was able to experience at the source. Once and for all has inorganic substance been formed in the image of the divine, of the idea of the crystal. Because the Partenon was once built at Athens, all mankind that so desires, can know the divine on its crystalline side, if I may use the expression, or feel what the divine idea of the crystal is like. This was revealed to us in Grece. Today our souls long to catch a vision of the divinity from another side. Greek art revealed to us the divine idea of inorganic matter, of the crystal. The art of our epoch, if it fulfill its mission, must reveal to us the divine idea of organic matter, of the organism. This is what Goethe "saw" in the primal plant. But only the Goethes of the world were able to grasp what Goethe had seen. Evolution as it really is, a constant metamorphosis caused by the living

idea, was only comprehended by a very few. The great mass of the world, led by the German state-appointed university professors, fell in on Darwin's mechanical travesty of real evolution. A few leading men of science are beginning to realize this today. But it will take centuries and centuries for the truly scientific knowledge of evolution working by itself alone, to permeate the masses. To acquire a scientific *knowledge* of evolution, a certain intellectual ability, which not many people as yet possess, is presupposition. But the *feeling* what an organism is, the emotional experience of evolution, could be attained by everybody, if a genius were plastically to place before us a building formed in the image of the idea of the organism, even as the Partenon is formed in the image of the idea of the crystal. For this plastic revelation of the divine idea of man, as the highest organism, do the souls of the modern proletarians long. Such a revelation could give to the proletarian the feeling of his human worth, could give to the proletariat the assurance it so longs for, that man is not an accident of the economic process but a self-contained and self-directing, *free* and divine being.

This plastic revelation of the divine idea of man exists in the Goetheanum built by Rudolf Steiner. This Goetheanum is made of wood. Two intersecting cylinders of different radii in massive natural wood, seclude the interior from the world. But this seclusion is not the mysterial secrecy of the pyramids nor yet a cloistral fleeing from the world. It is merely a temporary separation to give the sprouting life time and opportunity to develop. The hemispheres of silver-green Norwegian slate that form the roof, are importunate to tell us of the knowledge and discoveries that have been made within. The building is bilaterally symmetrical. One really feels, after studying this building, that he has seen the idea of man. While studying the sweeping architraves, chiselled out of massive wood, which surmount the mighty pillars of the interior, also of massive wood, an insight came to me concerning a matter that

had long perplexed me. Schiller's description of the path of development in an art, as proceeding from naive simplicity through complexity, to the simplicity of perfect art, accorded with my experience. But at the same time I had accepted, because it was taught to me by the professors, Spencer's Darwinian definition of evolution, as a development from simplicity to an ever increasing complexity of organic forms. These two things did not jibe, but I kept them both in different compartments of my soul. While studying the development of the motives of the architraves and capitals of the Goetheanum, I suddenly realized that Darwin and Spencer had painstakingly theorized about evolution, but had not seen the actual process of evolution at all. The human eye, for example, is not the most complex eye, as it would necessarily have to be according to Spencer and Darwin. The owls and the night birds of prey have eyes much more complex than ours. They have most complicated sword-projections and fan-like projections into the glass bodies of their eyes, which our eyes do not have. And yet our eyes are certainly more highly developed than their eyes. The human physical eye has reached the stage of simplicity again, a higher simplicity gained by passing through the stage of complexity. The fan-like and sword-like projections of our eye must be sought in the idea of the human eye. It is indescribably thrilling and exhilirating to have one's conceptual cobwebs and false structures brushed away and all the activities of one's soul put on the basis of experience instead of on the basis of theory. The contemplation of the artistic forms of this building can do this. It can, through the effect it produces on our emotions, effect a truly Pauline regeneration of thinking for the individual—the only regeneration, by the way, worth a picayune today. This Goetheanum solves the riddle of the Sphinx; it enables the beholder to carry out the admonition of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi. What is an organism? What is the knowledge of the highest of organisms, man? Not a complex agglutination of

cells on the way to greater complexity ad infinitum, as the dominant natural science asserts; not an automaton of the economic process, as the so-called social science maintains. An organism, man, is a being whose form and actions are determined from within his own soul by the necessity of his own being. If man only turn within himself and learn to see what is there presented, he will find within his own soul the self-contained lawfulness and necessity, which is freedom, the balance, proportion and harmony, which is divinity; he will find a true microcosmos.

Anthroposophy, in contra-distinction to anthropology, is what Dr. Rudolf Steiner calls the study to be carried on in this Goetheanum. Anthroposophy is not a field or domain of research, it is a *method* of investigation; it is the application of the Goetheanistic way of looking at life and the world, to science, religion and art, and industry. What this method, this way of looking at life and the world has produced and will be able to produce in the arts, has been faintly suggested here. Volumes will be written by students from all parts of the world, about the paintings and the sculptures of this building, about the Eurythmic art performed therein. What this anthroposophical method has to offer to our social life, may be seen in the way this Goetheanum was erected. The erection of the Goetheanum was begun during the war. Within hearing and seeing of the cannon of Belfort and Mühlhausen, while people at their states' behest were mutually tearing themselves to pieces, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Italians, Poles, Czchs, Slovaks, Russians, Germans and Americans were working side by side in mutual co-operation upon this building. It did not disturb the German, chiselling at the mighty architraves, that his companion talked French. It did not bother the Russian that his co-worker spoke English. Whether or not the league of nations proves to be anything more than a still-birth, here *is* a free association of peoples. Peoples of all nations and classes, counts and countesses, industrial and professional men and women, mechanics,

carpenters and laborers, voluntarily and gladly worked side by side and shoulder to shoulder in the erection of the Goetheanum. For this building *meant* something to them all. It gave them all a feeling for that view of the divine truth for which the people of this epoch long.

This Goetheanum is no theory. It is a fact. It stands on the hill of Dornach, a beacon that proclaims to the world what structures of divine beauty man can build when he follows his guiding genius. It challenges the world: Are men going to keep on thinking to the end of time, the same old thoughts which have produced and which will always produce, whenever put into operation, a state of war between the classes?

Immanuel Kant put into a philosophic system the middle class, the bourgeois manner of thinking. The clergy of the present day prove the soundness of the existing social order by citing Kant. The Bolshevik social order of Lenin and Trotzky is, however, likewise based on the philosophy of this same Kant, merely looked at from a different angle. There is nothing in this Kantian manner of thinking that can prevent an eternal war of class against class.

Seventy-two years ago, in 1848, a manifesto was issued to the workingmen of the world to unite and throw off their chains. Karl Marx thereby gave to the social movement a particular direction. A head-on collision of the same basic manner of thinking of the two classes, coming from opposite directions, was produced. This colliding is still going on in Europe in the conflict between Soviet Russia and the present order of the western world. One need be neither a prophet nor the son of a prophet to recognize that this state of war will be a perpetual affair, unless a different basic manner of thinking enters into the souls of men. We need no longer be in doubt as to this new manner of thinking that will regenerate, that will renew our minds. This manner of thinking has been given to the world in the "Call to the German People and to the Civilized World" by Rudolf Steiner.

The Goetheanum is the concrete evidence, it is the tangible fact that proves that this manner of thinking is able to lead mankind out of the class-war to co-operative, creative social effort.

Man today has the freedom of choice between two directions of social movement. The one course leads to a temporary overcoming of the class-war by an ephemeral victorious dictatorship of one of the two contending classes over the other. But there will be continual attempts to throw off this dictatorship by the class that happens to be subjugated. And these attempts mean recurrent revolutionary uprisings, bloodshed and devastation. The other course leads us, by means of the Triorganation of our Social Organism, to an organic, harmonius social structure of beauty, to a social microcosmos. We are already embarked upon the former course. We need only thoughtlessly drift along in order to experience the chaos into which it will plunge us. In order to take the latter course that has been shown to us by our guiding good genius through Rudolph Steiner, we need consciously to *will* this course.

O. Henry Frederick.

A list of the works of Dr. Rudolf Steiner that have been translated into English as well as the works themselves may be obtained from

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